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INTRODUCTION
What do the Oscars, Australia, and the City of San Francisco have
in common? All three use an unconventional voting system1 to select
winners in their respective contests for Academy Awards or political
office called instant-runoff voting (IRV).2 In IRV elections, voters
rank multiple candidates for a single position, rather than only
picking a single candidate for a given position.3 Recently, IRV has
become an increasingly discussed option for electoral systems both at
the state and city level.4 In 2016, Maine became the first state to

1. See Katharine Q. Seelye, As Australia and the Oscars Go, So Goes Maine?,
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Seelye, So Goes Maine?],
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html
[https://perma.cc/MV8Z-CSCV].
2. Outside of the legal world, IRV tends to be referred to as “ranked-choice
voting,” but legal scholars have insisted on referring to it as IRV. In deference to
their infinite wisdom, this Note will do the same. San Francisco is largely credited
with creating the term “ranked-choice voting.” See S.F. CITY CHARTER art. XIII, §
13.102 (2004); Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not
Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of A Voting System, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 334 n.35 (2006). There is no substantive difference between
the two, and the labels can be used interchangeably, but this Note will avoid doing so
for purposes of clarity.
3. See Seelye, So Goes Maine?, supra note 1.
4. Id.; see also In Praise of Ranked-Choice Voting, ECONOMIST (June 14, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/06/14/in-praise-of-ranked-choice-
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adopt IRV and implemented the system statewide in 2018 — doing so
for its U.S. Senate and House races.5
Proponents of IRV argue that it has many benefits, but the central
idea behind the system is that it is the most efficient means of
preventing unpopular candidates from winning elections with a
plurality — rather than a majority — of the vote.6 One recent
example of the kind of result IRV seeks to prevent is the 2018
Democratic primary for Massachusetts’s third congressional district,
where Lori Trahan declared victory after securing less than 21% of
the vote.7
Those in favor of IRV argue that it does more than just combat
low-plurality winners. Perhaps most importantly, IRV elections can
replace costly and relatively low-turnout runoff and primary elections,
saving cities and states tens of millions of dollars while increasing
voter participation.8
Additionally, by creating a system that
incentivizes candidates to appeal to a broader swath of the electorate,
rather than just their base, IRV can help combat hyper-partisan
campaigning and governing.9 This can give voters in the political
minority a louder voice in their government10 and increase voter
satisfaction with the electoral process.11 This can be particularly
important in cities like New York City, where one party often

voting [https://perma.cc/4DG2-GHXX]. In addition to public elections, there have
also been calls to implement IRV in private settings, such as corporate elections. See
generally G. Scott Edwards, Empowering Shareholders, or Overburdening

Companies? Analyzing the Potential Use of Instant Runoff Voting in Corporate
Elections, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1335 (2015).
5. Katharine Q. Seelye, Maine Adopts Ranked-Choice Voting. What Is It, and
How Will It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Seelye, Maine Adopts
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html
RCV],
[https://perma.cc/9V44-DFNM]; Timeline of Ranked Choice Voting in Maine,

FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/maine_ballot_initiative [https://perma.cc/K7KDWJ7N] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
6. Dick Dadey, Instant Run-Off Voting: End High Cost, Low Turnout Run-Off
Elections, 19 CITY L. 118 (2013); see also Edward B. Foley, Third-Party and
Independent Presidential Candidates: The Need for a Runoff Mechanism, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 993, 1012–20 (2016) (arguing for IRV in presidential elections to
prevent unpopular presidential candidates from winning under the electoral college).
7. Katharine Q. Seelye, Fans of Ranked Voting See an Opportunity in
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Seelye, Massachusetts],
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/massachusetts-voting-lori-trahan.html
[https://perma.cc/8M29-5839].
8. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
9. Benefits of RCV, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#rcvbenefits
[https://perma.cc/SX2Z-AX5H] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
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dominates local politics.12
It is also relevant in traditionally
conservative states like Texas, where the conservative leanings of the
state are often at odds with the goals of progressive cities like Dallas,
or El Paso.13 In statewide IRV systems, gubernatorial candidates in
states with a city-state political dynamic similar to that of Texas would
be incentivized to appeal to voters beyond the traditionally
conservative state electorate.14
While only one state has implemented IRV thus far, many cities
have been using the system for some time,15 and more cities and

12. In New York City, Democrats have a firm grip on the electorate. In the 2016
presidential election, it voted overwhelmingly for Democratic candidate Hillary
Clinton, as she received 79% of the vote from the city. Seth Barron, New York’s Red
Borough, CITY J. (2018), https://www.city-journal.org/html/new-yorks-red-borough15652.html [https://perma.cc/QWL4-6S63] (describing the extremely Democratic
political demographics of New York City, with Staten Island as a Republican
anomaly).
13. Ross Ramsey, Analysis: The Blue Dots in Texas’ Red Political Sea, TEX. TRIB.
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/11/11/analysis-blue-dots-texasred-political-sea/ [https://perma.cc/JFT2-B3A2]; see also Rick Su, Have Cities
Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181, 188 (2017) (discussing the
political divide between progressive cities and conservative state legislatures).
14. Problems
RCV
Can
Help
Solve,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/problems_rcv_can_help_solve
[https://perma.cc/QS49G8LR] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
15. San Francisco, for example, has been using IRV since 2004. Spotlight: Bay
Area,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/spotlight_bay_area#history_of_rcv_in_bay_area
[https://perma.cc/FVU9-24V2] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). See generally Where Is
Ranked
Choice
Voting
Used?,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used
[https://perma.cc/GZ5N-XGTC] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). The first U.S. city to use
some form of IRV was Cambridge, MA, which utilized IRV since the 1940s and
continues
to
do
so
today.
Spotlight:
Cambridge,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/spotlight_cambridge#history_rcv_cambridge
[https://perma.cc/2BNH-MGM5] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). Other cities currently
using some form of IRV include: Basalt, CO, Berkeley, CA, Minneapolis, MN,
Takoma Park, MD, and Telluride, CO. Where is Ranked Choice Voting Used?,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used
[https://perma.cc/5T22-VG7M] (last visited Oct. 13, 2011). The cities that currently
implement IRV, which include Oakland, St. Paul, and Minneapolis, tend to be
progressive when measured by their policy preferences. Chris Tausanovitch &
Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 3, 38 (2014) (measuring policy preferences of public in cities with populations
above 250,000). But the correlation between progressive cities and RCV has changed
recently, as the number of IRV bills being introduced in local and state legislatures
has increased dramatically. Between 2018 and 2019, state IRV legislation has been
introduced in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Washington. H.J.M. 19, 53d Leg. Sess., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2018); H.B. 35, 62d Leg., 2018
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2018); S. Bill 641, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); H.B. 6881, Gen.
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states are now seriously considering employing IRV in future
elections.16 This includes New York City, the largest city in the
country,17 and one that often portrays itself as a champion of
progressive policies.18 For New York City, as with many other cities
in the United States, implementing any major change to local election
law presents a potentially complex legal issue, as there are often
conflicts between state law and local law in this arena.19 New York
State law prescribes a runoff mechanism for three New York City
primaries — including its mayoral primaries.20 In considering IRV
for its primary elections (or any other change to its local elections),
New York City risks potential preemption challenges from the state
that could thwart any attempt to alter its voting laws.21 In particular,
§ 6-162 of New York’s Election Law likely preempts the City from
unilaterally altering its voting laws to implement IRV.22 While
amending § 6-162 to provide for IRV is one way to address this issue,

Assemb., Jan. Sess., (Conn. 2019); S.B. 427, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019); S.B.
306, 121st Gen, Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019); H.B. 26, 439th Gen. Assemb.
(Md. 2019); H.F. 983, 91st Leg. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019); H.B. 28, 100th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); J.Res. 5496, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2019); H.B.
2751, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); H.B 1722, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); S.F.
65, 65th Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019). Some of these laws seek to implement
IRV for statewide elections (including federal elections). See, e.g., H.B. 28, 100th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (requiring IRV in all state and local elections). Others
affirmatively grant localities the ability to use IRV in their local elections. See, e.g.,
H.B. 26, 439th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (authorizing the mayor and city council of
Baltimore to adopt IRV or open primary systems). There was also legislation
introduced in 2019 in New York State that seeks to mandate IRV for New York
City’s primary elections. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
16. In 2017, 25 bills were introduced in 14 states to implement IRV in various
local elections. Dan Diorio & Wendy Underhill, Ranked-Choice Voting, 25 NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 24 (June 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/ranked-choice-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/CWX8-BPKJ]; see Where is
Ranked Choice Voting Used?, supra note 15.
17. See
US
City
Populations,
WORLD
POP.
REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/ [https://perma.cc/J7PM-9QMC] (last
visited Oct. 14, 2019).
18. See, e.g., David Weigel, Bill de Blasio Declares a ‘New Progressive Era’ in
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
1,
2018),
New
York,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/01/01/bill-de-blasiodeclares-a-new-progressive-era-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/AX6Q-NFCQ].
19. See James P. Langan, Note, Instant Runoff Voting: A Cure that Is Likely
Worse than the Disease, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573–75 (2005) (noting the
failure of cities in the States of Washington and Texas to implement IRV where it
was deemed inconsistent with state law).
20. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018).
21. See infra Part II.A.i.
22. N.Y. ELEC. LAW, § 6-162.
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efforts to do so at the state level have been unsuccessful.23 Further,
given the fact that New York State Law regulates this aspect of New
York City elections, § 6-162 will remain a legal obstacle for New York
City in the future even if it is amended to prescribe IRV for city
primary elections.24 As long as § 6-162 remains in effect, New York
City will not have the same legal autonomy to regulate its own
elections as other localities throughout the state.
This Note argues that New York City should implement IRV for its
elections, but it should not do so through the options currently being
advocated — those options being a unilateral city charter revision or
an amendment to § 6-162 at the state level. Through a careful
analysis of § 6-162, its legislative history, subsequent judicial
interpretations, and existing legislation, this Note ultimately
concludes that § 6-162 violates both the New York Constitution and
the basic principles embodied in New York’s home rule doctrine. For
this reason, this Note argues that § 6-162 should first be repealed or
declared unconstitutional, and only then should New York City
implement IRV through a charter revision.
Part I begins with an overview of the predominant electoral
systems in the United States. It also provides an overview of IRV and
examines arguments by its proponents, who claim that it is a better
system than first-past-the-post and runoff schemes, and by its critics,
who disagree. Part II focuses specifically on New York State and
New York City — the current electoral dynamic between the city and
the state, how that dynamic developed, and how this structure creates
a legal obstacle that prevents New York City from unilaterally
implementing IRV for its most important city elections. In its final
Part, this Note first argues that, from a policy perspective, IRV makes
sense and more cities and states, including New York City, should
adopt it. Part III also presents multiple solutions that would allow
New York City to unilaterally implement IRV, but ultimately
concludes that a direct challenge to the constitutional validity of § 6-

23. See infra Part II.B.ii. However, New York State politics changed dramatically
in the 2018 state elections. Prior to these elections, Republicans had 31 seats in the
state senate while Democrats held 21 seats. In the other chamber of the state
legislature, the state house of representatives, the Democrats had an overwhelming
majority. After the 2018 elections, Democrats gained control of both chambers of the
state legislature, picking up 19 seats in the senate and 2 seats in the house. See Jesse
McKinley & Shane Goldmacher, Democrats Finally Control the Power in Albany.
What Will They Do With It?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/nyregion/democrats-ny-albany-cuomosenate.html [https://perma.cc/Y4CN-JMXV].
24. See infra Part II.B.ii.
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162 — one that would unambiguously clear the way for unilateral
implementation by the City — is the best path forward.
I. ONLY IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Because the U.S. Constitution delegates the power to regulate
elections — city, state, and federal — to the states,25 the United States
has a uniquely decentralized electoral system, where different states
employ different systems, and cities within those states often employ
systems different from the state in their local elections.26 This Part
examines the major voting schemes utilized by cities and states in the
United States. Section I.A examines the most popular voting system:
first-past-the-post. Section I.B examines runoff elections, while
Section I.C will examine primary elections. Section I.D examines
instant-runoff voting, how advocates for this kind of system have
argued it can solve the various problems associated with first-pastthe-post, primary, and runoff systems — and critics’ responses to
those arguments. Lastly, Section I.E will explore IRV advocacy less
abstractly by examining New York City and how lawmakers and
advocates at both the state and city level have attempted to bring
IRV to New York City.
A. First-Past-the-Post Voting Systems
In order to discuss instant-runoff voting, it is first necessary to
establish a working understanding of the predominant voting scheme
in the United States: first-past-the-post27 (FPP).28 Under FPP

25. The Constitution provides that states may establish “[t]he Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
4, cl. 1. Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the broad
authority states have to regulate federal and state elections. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–462 (1991) (“‘the Framers of the Constitution intended
the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power
to regulate elections’” (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124–125 (1970)).
But see Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) (noting that although
the states retain the power to regulate elections, “the Federal Government retains
significant control over federal elections”).
26. For an excellent overview of the variety of electoral systems in the United
States, including an interactive map, see Electoral Systems in the United States,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/research_electoralsystemsus
[https://perma.cc/9ECS-3EYG] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
27. O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333 (“Plurality voting is the most commonly used
voting system for single-member districts in the United States.”). For a detailed
description of various voting systems, see DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT
BOX 65 (2000). The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is also a useful and
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systems, the candidate who receives the most votes is declared the
winner.29 This is true whether the candidate receives 99% or 9% of
the total vote, as long as that total is greater than that of the next best
candidate. Every state except Maine utilizes this system for federal
elections, including presidential elections.30 While FPP elections
seem intuitive for many people, they can lead to seemingly
undemocratic results in cases where a candidate wins with
significantly less than a majority percentage of the total vote.31 This

interactive website for understanding how different electoral systems are designed.
Electoral
Systems,
ACE
ELECTORAL
KNOWLEDGE
NETWORK,
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/ese/ese01/ese01a [https://perma.cc/A4V7-K5E7]
(last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
28. “First-Past-the-Post” has also been referred to as “winner-take-all,” but
political scientists and academics alike prefer FPP, so this Note will follow suit.
29. O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333.
30. See
Charles
King,
Electoral
Systems,
GEO.
UNIV.
(2000),
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm [https://perma.cc/JR4CUAKD]. Much has been written about reforming the method by which states select
electors for presidential elections, with IRV proposed as one option. See American
Democracy’s Built-In Bias Towards Rural Republicans, ECONOMIST (July 12, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/12/american-democracys-built-in-biastowards-rural-republicans [https://perma.cc/7C97-7CFX] (arguing that FPP has given
rise to increased partisanship in national elections and that IRV “give[s] officeseekers a reason to build bridges with opponents rather than torch them.”); Eric
Maskin & Amartya Sen, Opinion, A Better Electoral System in Maine, N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/10/opinion/electoral-systemmaine.html [https://perma.cc/JU7T-PTQV] (describing how IRV would have changed
the outcome of the 2016 presidential election).
31. There are many examples of this, including the 2000 and 2016 presidential
elections where presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump secured victories by
winning the electoral vote but not the popular vote. These both translated to plurality
wins because states select their electors for the electoral college based on whoever
wins the state by a plurality. See 2016 Presidential Election, 270 TO WIN,
https://www.270towin.com/2016_Election/
[https://perma.cc/5AH3-PMLE]
(last
visited
Oct.
14,
2019);
2000
Presidential
Election,
https://www.270towin.com/2000_Election
[https://perma.cc/YBH9-FEDN]
(last
visited Oct. 14, 2019); see also Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency:
An Introduction and Overview, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 982–87 (2016). Indeed,
simulations show that Trump would have lost most of the Republican primary
contests if every state employed the system for presidential primaries. See Andrew
Douglas et al., Simulating Instant Runoff Flips Most Donald Trump Primary
FAIRVOTE
(Mar.
4,
2016),
Victories,
https://www.fairvote.org/simulating_instant_runoff_flips_most_donald_trump_primar
y_victories [https://perma.cc/3UD5-WPEV]. While these are the most well-known
instances of controversial plurality winners, there are many more examples in
gubernatorial and congressional races, such as Maine’s 2014 gubernatorial, where
Paul LePage won re-election with around 48% of the vote. In fact, it was the reelection of Mr. LePage that spurred Maine to become the first state to adopt IRV.
See Seelye, So Goes Maine?, supra note 1 and accompanying text. In the
congressional context, Lori Trahan won the Democratic primary for a congressional
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risk directly increases as the number of candidates in a given field
increases.32 In a two-candidate race, which is typically a general
election, FPP does not pose this problem, because one of those
candidates will necessarily need to secure a majority in order to win.
But in a more crowded field, such as a primary election where there
can be upwards of ten candidates, a candidate could hypothetically
win by securing only about 10% of the vote.33
FPP systems also incentivize hyper-partisanship by candidates. In
a crowded field, a candidate in an FPP system is rewarded by isolating
a faction of the electorate rather than by appealing more broadly to
the entire electorate, especially in a single-party primary.34 This, by
extension, incentivizes negative campaigning by candidates, where the
focus is on attacking opponents and isolating a faction, rather than on
advocating for their policies — something that gets voter’s attention,
but they paradoxically detest.35
B. Traditional Runoff Systems
Several states36 and cities37 mitigate the problem of low-plurality
winners through a runoff mechanism within their respective FPP

seat based in Lowell, Massachusetts by securing less than 21% of the vote. Seelye,
Massachusetts, supra note 7.
32. E.g., Seelye, Massachusetts, supra note 7 and accompanying text (primary
winner declared after securing 21% of the vote in a field of ten candidates).
33. See, e.g., id.
34. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The Secret to Cracking Trump’s Base, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/opinion/trump-base-polls.html
[https://perma.cc/CYK9-JXU6]. Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign is a
great illustration of this phenomenon. Then-candidate Trump was successful in the
Republican primaries largely because he isolated a faction, what many commentators
referred to and still refer to as his “base.” Id. The crowded field of Republican
contenders created a scenario where a candidate, like Trump, needed to secure only a
larger percentage of the vote than the next best candidate, and he could do so by
attacking both Republicans and Democrats. See Paul Schwartzman & Jenna Johnson,
It’s Not Chaos. It’s Trump’s Campaign Strategy, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/its-not-chaos-its-trumps-campaignstrategy/2015/12/09/9005a5be-9d68-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6CU4-9LKF]; see also Massimo Bordignon et al., Moderating
Political Extremism: Single Round Versus Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule,
106 AM. ECON. REV. 8, 2349–70 (2016) (comparing the influence of extremist voters
on candidates in plurality systems to runoff systems).
35. See John Cassidy, Closing Arguments: The Logic of Negative Campaigning,
NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/closingarguments-the-logic-of-negative-campaigning [https://perma.cc/3F68-55R].
36. See ALA. CODE § 17-13-18 (2018) (held unconstitutional on other grounds by
United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 2015)); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7102, 7-7-202, 7-7-304 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-501 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. §
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systems.38 In these jurisdictions, “runoff”39 elections are held if no
candidate emerges from a primary (or in some cases, general) election
without the majority of the vote or with less than a statutorily
prescribed threshold.40
In a runoff election, the candidate(s)
receiving the lowest percentage of the vote in the initial election are
“run off” the ballot and do not appear as choices in the subsequent
runoff election.41 This typically allows one of the remaining
candidates to capture a majority — or the requisite threshold
percentage — of the vote and claim victory.42
While runoff elections can help combat low-plurality winners in
FPP systems, there are two main critiques of runoff systems. First,
holding a second election is expensive.43 In New York City, for
example, the last runoff election cost the city more money than the
entire annual budget for the office for which the runoff was being
conducted.44 Additionally, it has been empirically shown that in a
subsequent runoff election, turnout drastically decreases — especially
among poor and minority voters.45 Because of this, runoff voting

23-15-191 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-103 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-50
(1976); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 172.003-172.004 (1986).
37. See, e.g., BALT., MD., CODE art. IV, § 1 (2018); L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE art.
IV, § 425 (2015). See generally Portland St. Univ. & the Knight Foundation, Who
Votes for Mayor? (2016), http://www.whovotesformayor.org/ [https://perma.cc/WJ59QLD3] (noting that primary elections with a runoff mechanism are the most popular
method for mayoral elections in U.S. cities).
38. Two states — Georgia and Louisiana — currently conduct general election
runoffs for federal and state-level positions. Runoff Elections, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Runoff_election [https://perma.cc/8HBK-A52Q] (last visited
Oct. 7, 2019). Ten states conduct runoffs in their primary elections. Primary Runoffs,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/primary-runoffs.aspx [https://perma.cc/6XCS-WJTY] (last visited Oct. 7,
2019).
39. Runoff systems are also sometimes referred to as “two-round” systems. See,
e.g., Electoral Systems: Two-Round System, ACE ELECTORAL NETWORK,
http://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd04.htm [https://perma.cc/MEE9-HR96] (last
visited October 7, 2019).
40. O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The “average cost” of a runoff election would be an inappropriate statistic for
demonstrating this point because cost is often relative to the size of the jurisdiction in
which the election is taking place. But there are clear overall costs of runoff elections.
See infra Section I.C.
44. See infra Section I.C.
45. See Bernard L. Fraga, The Turnout Gap Between Whites and Racial
Minorities Is Larger than You Think — and Hard to Change, WASH. POST (Sept. 25,
2018)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/25/theturnout-gap-between-whites-and-racial-minorities-is-larger-than-you-think-and-hard-
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systems have been challenged a number of times on constitutional
grounds, as well as on the grounds that they violate the Voting Rights
Act, but such challenges have been largely unsuccessful.46
C. Primary Elections
Much like FPP voting, primary elections are extremely popular
throughout the United States.47 Primaries are elections utilized by
parties in order to narrow the field of candidates so that only one
candidate will ultimately run as the party’s candidate in the general
election.48 Prior to primary elections, the candidate who would
appear on the ballot as the given party’s nominee would directly or
indirectly be chosen by “party bosses.”49 The primary was, and still is,
seen as a purer form of democracy50 where the voters, rather than
party leaders, have a say in who will ultimately emerge as the party’s
nominee for a given position.51
to-change/ [https://perma.cc/7P4S-9J7W]; Elaine C. Kamarck, The Importance of
Increasing Turnout in Congressional Primaries, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Mar.
28,
2016),
https://ssir.org/increasing_voter_turnout/entry/the_importance_of_increasing_turnout
_in_congressional_primaries [https://perma.cc/SGR2-KCDZ]; Kelly Born, Increasing
Voter Turnout: What, If Anything, Can Be Done?, STAN. SOC. REV. (Apr. 25, 2016)
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/increasing_voter_turnout_what_if_anything_can_be_don
e [https://perma.cc/X7AS-9S2E].
46. See generally Gregory G. Ballard, Note, Application of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to Runoff Primary Election Laws, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1991)
(arguing that jurisdictions requiring majority threshold dilute minority vote in
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act). See also infra note 202. For additional
critiques
of
runoff
systems,
see
Benefits
of
RCV,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/rcvbenefits [https://perma.cc/467F-8US6] (last visited Oct. 4,
2019). For example, a candidate who could have ultimately won the election may not
be on the ballot in the second round, but voters may have voted differently if they
knew a certain candidate did not garner enough votes to reach the majority
threshold. Id.
47. BENJAMIN GINSBERG ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN POLITICS 349 (Ann Shin et al. eds., 8th ed. 2011). In fact, the United
States is one of the only countries in the world to utilize a primary system. Id.
48. See generally id.
49. U.S.
Political
Conventions
and
Campaigns,
NE.
UNIV.,
https://conventions.cps.neu.edu/nominations-conventions/past-practices/primariesand-conventions/ [https://perma.cc/L6YV-4HQW] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
50. For a comprehensive overview of the origins of primary elections, see
CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM & LOUISE OVERACKER MERRIAM, PRIMARY
ELECTIONS (1928).
51. It should be noted that the meaning and impact of primary election votes
depends, in part, on the particular kind of primary system that is used — open,
closed, or blanket. See Sean M. Ramaley, Comment, Is The Bell Tolling: Will the
Death of the Partisan Blanket Primary Signal the End for Open Primary Elections?,
63 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 218–20 (2001). In a closed primary, a voter is only permitted
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Primaries are not perfect in practice, however, and they have the
same major issues as runoff voting mechanisms: cost and turnout. In
2016, the combined cost of statewide primary elections in all states
was just under $500 million.52 California accounted for one-fifth of
this cost, where the 2016 presidential primaries cost its taxpayers
around $100 million.53 It is important to note that these costs are in
addition to the costs for running a general election, which are even
more expensive to conduct than primary elections.54 Primary
to vote in the primary election for candidates from the same political party under
which he or she is registered. Id. at 219. In open primaries, voters are permitted to
vote in whichever party’s primary they prefer, regardless of their own party
affiliation, but they are restricted to only voting in one party’s primary. Id. Lastly, in
blanket primaries “all voters receive the same ballot, and a voter is not limited to the
candidates of any single party but may vote, as to each office contested, for any
candidate regardless of party affiliation.” Id. at 219–20 (quoting Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 1997)). Blanket primaries have
been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because they violate a party’s
First Amendment associational rights. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,
577 (2000) (“[Blanket primaries] force[] political parties to associate with — to have
their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by — those who, at best, have
refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival.
In this respect, it is qualitatively different from a closed primary.”). In considering the
constitutionality of a state’s primary regime, the Supreme Court has shown a
preference for the associational rights of a party where the party itself wants to open
(or close) its primary election to those who are not affiliated with any party or even
members of other parties. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S.
208, 215 (1986) (holding that Connecticut’s law prohibiting parties from conducting
open primaries impermissibly violated the associational rights of parties wishing to
conduct open primaries). In what is perhaps an issue regarding primaries the
Supreme Court will visit in the future, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently upheld Hawaii’s state law requiring open primaries. Democratic
Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016). The case was interesting
in that the state law at issue was very similar to California’s blanket primary law that
the Supreme Court struck down in Jones. Like California’s law, Hawaii’s constitution
required parties to allow all voters, regardless of political affiliation, to participate in
their primaries. Id. at 1121 (citing HAW. CONST. art. II, § 4). However, unlike the
California law in Jones, Hawaii’s constitution did not allow “cross voting,” which is a
scheme where a voter can change which party’s candidate they vote for office by
office. Id. (“[V]oters must commit to one party’s slate prior to voting; they may not
choose a Republican nominee for one state office and a Democratic nominee for a
different state office.”). This was apparently enough of a distinction for the Ninth
Circuit, but it remains to be seen if such a distinction is sufficient in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, which denied the Hawaii State Democrats petition for writ of
certiorari after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 137 S.
Ct. 2114 (2017).
52. Taxpayer
Costs
of
Closed
Primaries,
OPEN
PRIMARIES,
https://www.openprimaries.org/taxpayer_costs_of_closed_primaries
[https://perma.cc/KQJ4-E4RD] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
53. Id.
54. See Stephen Ansolabehere, The Search for New Voting Technology, BOS.
REV. (Oct. 1, 2001), https://bostonreview.net/forum/stephen-ansolabehere-search-
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elections also suffer the same turnout issue as runoff elections, as
turnout is far lower than in general elections and those that do
participate in primary elections tend to be older, whiter, and richer.55
D. Instant-Runoff Voting
IRV seeks to combat the issues of FPP systems and extract the
benefits of runoff voting without the incurring the additional costs
and low-turnout. A typical IRV system requires voters to rank
candidates in order of preference, rather than picking only one
candidate like they do in traditional FPP systems.56 If no candidate
wins a majority of first-place votes in the initial round of vote-tallying,
the last place candidate is eliminated, and the votes are redistributed
based on voters’ listed preferences.57 This process continues until a
candidate emerges with a majority of first-place votes.58
Not all IRV systems are the same, however. They can differ based
on the number of candidates a voter can rank, how many candidates a
voter is required to rank, and the threshold vote percentage
requirement a candidate must reach before being declared the
winner.59

new-voting-technology-0 [https://perma.cc/ZA9T-HTTK] (discussing MIT study that
estimated America’s counties and municipalities spent $1 billion conducting the 2000
elections); see also Brad Tuttle, How Much Election Day Costs the Country — and
Voters, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/money/4556642/election-day-2016-costscountry-voters/ [https://perma.cc/9VPP-AY24].
55. See supra note 45; see also What Affects Voter Turnout Rates?, FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/what_affects_voter_turnout_rates [https://perma.cc/8VG58FUM] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
56. See generally Brian P. Marron, One Person, One Vote, Several Elections?:
Instant Runoff Voting and the Constitution, 28 VT. L. REV. 343, 343–47 (2004)
(describing IRV as a system “having a second distinct — but not independent —
election”).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. San Francisco, California allows — but does not require — voters to rank up
to three candidates and has a required threshold of 50% for a candidate to be
declared a winner. Marking Your Ballot: Ranked-Choice Voting, S.F. DEP’T
ELECTIONS, https://sfelections.sfgov.org/marking-your-ballot [https://perma.cc/S8GMTAUC] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Cambridge, Massachusetts allows — but also does
not require — voters to rank as many candidates as can appear on the ballot.
Cambridge
Municipal
Elections,
CITY
OF
CAMBRIDGE,
https://www.cambridgema.gov/Departments/electioncommission/cambridgemunicipal
elections [https://perma.cc/33KG-FTBN] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
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Fig. 1.1. Four-Round IRV Election with a Majority Threshold and
Ranking Requirement
Candidate
A

Candidate
B

Candidate
C

Candidate
D

Round 1

25%

12%

36%

20%

Round 2

26%

39%

22%

Round 3

36%

Round 4

13%

Eliminated

40%

53%

47%

Winner

Eliminated

Candidate
E
9%

Eliminated

24%

Eliminated

Figure 1.1 shows a hypothetical IRV election involving five
candidates, A through E, where the required threshold to win is 50%
— a true majority of votes. The first round shows the percentage of
first-place votes each candidate received, with no candidate receiving
anywhere close to the required 50%.60 Candidate E received the
fewest first-place votes and is thus eliminated from the vote tallying in
any subsequent rounds. Now, votes for the next-ranked candidate by
any voter who ranked Candidate E first are distributed amongst the
remaining candidates in the second round. In the second round,
Candidate B is eliminated and the process continues for four rounds
until one candidate — in this case, Candidate A — emerges with a
majority of the votes. In this model, the assumption is that each voter
was required to rank all five of the candidates, so there is no
possibility that the ultimate winner would not obtain a majority of the
votes. Notice an interesting aspect of this race — the candidate who
initially received the plurality of the vote, Candidate C, did not end
up winning the election.61

60. If a candidate did receive a majority of the votes in the first round, the
election would end without the need for subsequent (instant) runoff rounds.
61. A situation where the initial winner of the plurality vote ends up losing the
election in an IRV system is not purely hypothetical — it has occurred and caused
predicable controversy. In the 2010 mayoral race for Oakland, California, the initial
plurality winner, Don Perata, eventually lost to Jean Quan, who implemented a
campaign strategy that involved attracting other candidates’ supporters for secondplace votes. See Jenny Starrs & Daron Taylor, Can Ranked-Choice Voting End Ugly
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Essentially, IRV provides the same runoff mechanism as
traditional runoff systems, but without the time and expense involved
in an additional election.62 The money IRV can save in this respect is
perhaps its most demonstrable benefit. In cities that employ
traditional runoff systems, like New York City, if no candidate
reaches a certain threshold percentage of the vote in primary
elections,63 holding a second runoff election dramatically increases
the already high cost of conducting a primary election, in addition to a
general election.64 By replacing runoffs with IRV, governments could
significantly reduce the cost of conducting elections.
In addition to runoffs, some proponents have suggested that IRV
can also eliminate the need for a primary election to be held before a
general election.65 Indeed, the elimination of primaries in favor of a
single IRV election has already occurred in Minneapolis, Minnesota
where the city implemented a single, general IRV election for
multiple local offices in 2006.66 As previously discussed, primary
elections are a means of narrowing the field to a single candidate, who
will represent a political party on a ballot in the general election,
avoiding the risk that a party will split the vote among its own
members and hand the election to a candidate from another, more

Election Battles? This November, Maine Hopes to Find Out., WASH. POST (Nov. 1,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/31/can-ranked-choice-votingend-ugly-election-battles-this-november-maine-hopes-findout/?utm_term=.ba37be8088f3 [https://perma.cc/HE29-6Y8U]; Zusha Elinson &
Gerry Shih, The Winning Strategy in Oakland: Concentrate on Being 2nd or 3rd
Choice,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
11,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/us/politics/12bcvoting.html
[https://perma.cc/2S2Z-S2HT]. More recently, in the first use of IRV for a federal
congressional election, Bruce Poliquin won more votes than Jared Golden in the first
round, but ended up losing to Golden in the second round, after Golden captured
50.6% of the vote. See Jamie Ehrlich, Maine Governor Deems Congressional
Election ‘Stolen’ While Certifying Result, CNN (Dec. 29, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/politics/maine-governor-certifies-congressionalelection/index.html [https://perma.cc/YN5H-677K]. In certifying the election, thenGovernor Paul LePage wrote “Stolen Election” next to his signature. Paul R. LePage
(@Governor_LePage),
Twitter
(Dec.
28,
2018,
2:58
PM),
https://twitter.com/Governor_LePage/status/1078726890746191872

[https://perma.cc/Z3L3-2EV4].
62. See Herbert E. Cihak, The Help America Vote Act: Unmet Expectations?, 29
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 679, 700 (2007).
63. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018); see infra Section II.B.i.
64. See supra Section I.C.
65. Problems RCV Can Help Solve, supra note 14.
66. See Brandt William, Judge Upholds Instant Runoff Voting in Minneapolis,
MPR NEWS (Jan. 14, 2009), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/01/14/irv_ruling
[https://perma.cc/LKA3-RMGH].
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unified party.67 Advocates of IRV argue that it can serve as a more
efficient means to the same end.68 Instead of having a separate, costly
primary with low voter-turnout (relative to the general election), IRV
would provide one, high-turnout election where voter preferences
have the best chance to be reflected in the makeup of a city’s or
state’s elected body.69 Under this approach, however, a party might
still be concerned with the possibility of candidates splitting the vote
among the party, allowing a candidate from another party to
capitalize on that vote splitting. While this would be an issue in an
FPP general election where there are multiple candidates from the
same party, the problem is greatly reduced under IRV. In Figure 1.2,
consider the election that was previously discussed, except now the
candidates are labeled according to party. In this example, assume
there was no primary election and instead just one general IRV
contest where multiple candidates from the same party could appear
on the ballot.
Figure 1.2. Multi-Candidate Party Representation in General IRV
Election
Candidate
A
Republican

Candidate
B
Republican

Candidate
C
Democrat

Candidate
D
Democrat

Round 1

25%

12%

36%

20%

Round 2

26%

39%

22%

Round 3

36%

Round 4

13%

Eliminated

40%

53%

47%

Winner

Eliminated

Candidate
E
Socialist
9%

Eliminated

24%

Eliminated

As the example shows, while vote-splitting still might occur under
IRV, its effects are likely negligible in terms of determining the
ultimate winner of the election. While too many candidates on the
ballot from a single party might initially dilute the vote percentage

67. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
68. Problems RCV Can Help Solve, supra note 14.
69. Id.; see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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each of those candidates receive, that dilution will be isolated for the
most part within the party’s lines. If the two Republican candidates
split the party vote 50-50, there is a credible assumption that, when
the first of those two candidates is eliminated, the remaining
candidate will receive the eliminated candidate’s votes, because a
voter who ranked one of the Republican candidates first likely ranked
the other Republican candidate second. Ultimately, under IRV, a
candidate from the more popular party will be declared the winner,
unlike in an FPP election where, if the more popular party splits the
vote, a candidate from a less popular party with less of a split might
end up winning the election.
Proponents of IRV point to more than just the recouped runoff
costs as justifying the voting scheme. They argue that IRV also
combats many of the paramount concerns accompanying traditional
American electoral systems.70 First, IRV increases the likelihood that
a winning candidate will have majority support when compared to a
traditional FPP system.71 Just like in traditional runoff systems, an
IRV system can mandate that a candidate must obtain the majority of
votes in order to be declared the winner.72 Conversely, under a FPP
system with no runoff mechanism, a candidate can win with a
plurality of votes even where the overall percentage of votes the
candidate received is far less than a majority.73

70. See
generally
Ranked-Choice
Voting
(RCV),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ranked-choice_voting_. [https://perma.cc/QKS6-2ERR] (last
visited Oct. 14, 2019).
71. See Michael Lewyn, Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting, 6 PHOENIX L.
REV. 117, 121 (2012); Data on Ranked-Choice Voting: Voting Preferences, Spoilers
FAIRVOTE,
and
Majority
Winners,
https://www.fairvote.org/data_on_rcv#research_rcvsocialchoice
[https://perma.cc/DY44-B5BP] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). While there is not much
data on this aspect of IRV, FairVote is currently using ballot image data to research
the relative tendencies of IRV and FPP to elect majority winners. Id.
72. See Marron, supra note 56, at 343–47.
73. See O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333. However, it is still possible under some IRV
systems that a candidate will emerge a winner even though they failed to receive a
majority of the vote. See Lewyn, supra note 71, at 122. For example, in a system like
San Francisco’s, where voters are not required to rank more than one candidate, S.F.
DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 59, if every voter only chose one candidate, the election
would operate exactly the same as an FPP election. If enough voters fail to rank a
sufficient number of candidates, after a given number of rounds, there may just not
be enough votes to have any single candidate achieve a majority. Additionally, this
issue could be easily solved if voters were required to rank a given number of
candidates — a number based on the number of candidates on the ballot that would
ensure by mathematical certainty the winner would need a majority of votes to win.
Even with these potential shortcomings, IRV still does a better job on paper at
ensuring a true majority winner than FPP.
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Second, proponents argue that IRV increases voter satisfaction. A
number of surveys have shown that voters who participate in IRV
elections feel that their ballot is more meaningful than in a traditional
system where a voter can only choose one candidate.74 A traditional
FPP system is essentially a zero-sum game — if a voter chooses a
candidate that does not win, his or her vote is exhausted. In an IRV
system, however, if a voter’s preferred candidate does not win, the
voter can still impact the election with their subsequent candidate
rankings. Proponents of IRV argue that part of this increased voter
satisfaction is caused by decreased negative campaigning in IRV
elections.75 Negative campaigning has become increasingly prevalent
in modern politics, despite its adverse impact on voter satisfaction,76
and IRV proponents argue that candidates in an IRV election are
incentivized to compete for first-place votes as well as votes for
second place, third place, and so on. 77 Put more simply, they argue
IRV elections incentivize candidates to appeal to a broader swath of
the electorate, rather than appealing only to their base.78 Although
negative campaigning can be difficult to quantify, one quantitative
measure that IRV advocates rely on to bolster this claim is voter
perception. In the same surveys previously referenced, voters
reported perceiving less negative campaigning in IRV cities versus
cities not employing IRV.79
However, there are valid criticisms of IRV worth noting.80 One of
the central critiques is simply a cost-benefit argument: the costs
associated with implementing IRV are simply not worth the
purported benefits.81 First, cities that implement IRV typically
74. See Ranked Choice Voting in Practice: Candidate Civility in Ranked Choice
Elections, 2013 & 2014 Survey Brief, FAIRVOTE [hereinafter FairVote Survey Brief],

https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/APSA-Civility-Brief-2015
[https://perma.cc/UEX5EJCB] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019); see also SARAH JOHN, FAIRVOTE, RANKED
CHOICE VOTING IN PRACTICE: CANDIDATE CIVILITY AND VOTER UNDERSTANDING
CALIFORNIA
SURVEY],
1–6
(2015)
[hereinafter
FAIRVOTE
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/CA-rcv-civility-survery
[https://perma.cc/9ZJGPPAB].
75. Id. at 2.
76. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
77. See Campaign Civility: Ranked Choice Voting and Civil Campaigning,
https://www.fairvote.org/research_rcvcampaigncivility
FAIRVOTE
[https://perma.cc/5AMQ-86G6] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
78. See Bordignon et al., supra note 34, at 2349–50.
79. FairVote Survey Brief, supra note 74, at 2.
80. See generally Langan, supra note 19.
81. See, e.g., David Sharp, Ranked Choice as Easy as 1,2,3? Not So Fast, Critics
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Oct.
9,
2016),
Say,
https://www.apnews.com/62c997cfd2ab403ca0b3c3333e1a9312
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employ some kind of voter education system in order to introduce the
system to the electorate and explain the differences between IRV and
more traditional voting methods.82 While the depth of these voter
education programs can vary,83 implementing any kind of program
does require the city to divert its administrative and financial
resources to some extent.84 Second, counting ballots in an IRV
system can be extremely time-consuming if done by hand, adding to
the overall cost of an election.85 Not all electronic voting systems
have the ability to count IRV ballots,86 and localities might be
required to replace or update their existing machines.87

[https://perma.cc/PK63-UU9G]; Gordon L. Weil, Ranked-Choice Voting: Costly,
Complicated, Undemocratic, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.pressherald.com/2016/09/30/maine-voices-ranked-choice-voting-costlycomplicated-undemocratic/ [https://perma.cc/6QQ4-LPQD]; see also Langan, supra
note 19, at 1595.
82. See, e.g., S.F. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 59.
83. See generally CTR. FOR CIVIC DESIGN, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
INTRODUCING
RANKED
CHOICE
VOTING
BALLOTS
6–8
(2018),
https://civicdesign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Introducing-RCV-Ballots-180803-FNAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRD7-2MRB].
84. However, a 2018 study concluded that “[o]verall, election cycle cost data of
cities that have implemented RCV shows that any change to the cost of elections
either during or after the switch to RCV is not statistically significant.” Christopher
Rhode, The Cost of Ranked Choice Voting, N. ARIZ. U. 15 (2018),
https://esra.wisc.edu/papers/Rhode.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B3S-DR3Z]. See also The
Cost of Ranked Choice Voting, MIT ELECTION LAB (July 27, 2018),
https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/the-cost-of-ranked-choice-voting-522e646db323
[https://perma.cc/8JCK-G78K] (discussing the study). But see How Much Will It Cost
to Implement RCV?, VOTER CHOICE MASS., https://www.voterchoicema.org/faq_cost
[https://perma.cc/75LF-ZLR8] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (estimating the cost of voter
education in the state of Massachusetts to be $500,000).
85. See Langan, supra note 19, at 1585; see, e.g., Steve Brandt, Hand-Counting
Ballots in Instant-Runoff Vote Called ‘Huge Nightmare’, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2008),
http://www.startribune.com/hand-counting-in-instant-runoff-vote-called-hugenightmare/35201754/
[https://perma.cc/T4DV-7X3T]
(discussing
the
issues
Minneapolis was expected to face by implementing an IRV without a fully automated
vote count).
86. The three largest voting machine manufacturers in the United States have
responded to the demand for systems that are compatible with IRV. Election
Systems and Software (ES&S) machines are all compatible with IRV elections,
although some may require some modifications, and still require third party software
to assist with the vote counting. RCV and Election Administration, FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv_administration#voting_systems_and_rcv
[https://perma.cc/D86W-HCLX] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Dominion, another one
of the three main manufacturers, has begun selling a machine which includes a
module for conducting IRV elections. Id. This machine does not require any thirdparty software or modifications, in contrast to the ES&S machines. Id. Hart
Intercivic, the third major manufacturer, is the only one of these three manufacturers
to have a federally certified IRV system, although only one city has used its machines
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Critics also argue that IRV will lead to voter confusion, because
the system is too complicated for voters who are used to FPP voting,88
and voters cannot be expected to educate understand the
consequences of their ranking decisions.89 Moreover, these critics
point to data suggesting that voter confusion is an issue that
disproportionately impacts poor and minority voters.90
Others suggest that IRV does not always guarantee a majority
winner.91 This is for two reasons. First, in an IRV system where
candidates only need to obtain a percentage less than 50% to win,
IRV still allows candidates to win an election with a plurality of the
votes, undercutting one of its biggest purported benefits. This
scenario is demonstrated in Figure 1.3, where the exact same values
from Figure 1.1 are used, but there is only a 40% threshold
requirement to be elected, leading to a different candidate winning
the election by securing less than a majority of the votes. In the
Figure 1.3 election, there is no need for a fourth round, as Candidate
C reached the prescribed vote requirement in the third round.

in an IRV election. Id. Hart Intercivic’s machine does not require third-party
software like ES&S’s machines. Id.
87. See, e.g., Dan Diorio & Wendy Underhill, Ranked-Choice Voting, NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=p5luAhhYpyE 3d&tabid=31410&port
alid=1 [https://perma.cc/DAT6-QNCW] (“The Maine Secretary of State’s office said
it would need $761,000 in 2017–2018 and $641,000 in 2018–2019 for additional ballot
pages and updated voting equipment[]” in order to implement IRV state-wide).
88. DAVID C. KIMBALL & JOSEPH ANTHONY, VOTER PARTICIPATION WITH
RANKED
CHOICE
VOTING
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
4
(2016),
http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/KimballRCV.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3BX-TGE4];
Langan, supra note 19, at 1592.
89. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 81 (“Instead of simply voting for the candidate you
prefer, each voter must have an election strategy.”).
90. See KIMBALL & ANTHONY, supra note 88, at 4 (“[t]here is evidence in
American elections that confusing voting equipment or ballot designs produce more
voting errors, and the impact of poor design falls disproportionately on low income
and minority voters”).
91. See Lewyn, supra note 71, at 122 and accompanying text.
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Fig. 1.3. Three-Round IRV Election with a 40% Threshold and
Ranking Requirement
Candidate
A

Candidate
B

Candidate
C

Candidate
D

Round 1

25%

12%

36%

20%

Round 2

26%

39%

22%

Round 3

36%

40%
Winner

24%

13%

Eliminated

Candidate
E
9%

Eliminated

Round 4

Second, in a system where voters are not required to rank a given
number of candidates, there is no guarantee that voters will rank
enough candidates to allow the system to work.92 Further, if voters
only list one preference or if they only list relatively weak candidates,
their votes may not end up being counted in the later rounds,
something known as “ballot exhaustion.”93 The example in Figure 1.4
shows what can occur if an IRV system only requires voters to choose
one candidate, but allows them to rank up to three candidates. Under
such a system, it is possible that most or all voters will only choose a
single candidate. If that occurs, and no candidate reaches the
statutorily proscribed threshold, the last-place candidate would be
eliminated, but there would be little to no votes to be redistributed
from each eliminated candidate. Consequently, the winner may not
even be able to reach the required threshold to win the election, and
the system would essentially revert to a traditional FPP system, where
the winner would be declared solely on the basis of who receives the
most votes.

92. San Francisco utilizes an IRV statute that does not require voters to rank
more than one candidate. See S.F., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102 (2002).
93. See Simon Waxman, Ranked-Choice Voting Is Not the Solution,
DEMOCRACY J. (Nov. 3, 2016), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/rankedchoice-voting-is-not-the-solution/ [https://perma.cc/84R4-WXS7].
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Fig. 1.4. IRV Election with a Majority Threshold Requirement and
No Ranking Requirement
Candidate
A

Candidate
B

Candidate
C

Candidate
D

Round 1

25%

12%

36%

20%

Round 2

25%

36%

20%

Round 3

25%

36%

20%
Eliminated

Round 4

25%
Eliminated

36%
Winner

12%

Eliminated

Candidate
E
9%

Eliminated

Despite these criticisms, many cities have been using IRV in local
elections for some time. San Francisco, the largest U.S. city to utilize
IRV, has been using it since 2002 in its mayoral elections.94 Twelve
cities and localities and one state (Maine) currently have some form
of IRV in place or a system that will be effective by 2021.95 The data
on IRV from these cities have been generally positive. The earlier
referenced FairVote surveys measuring voter satisfaction in IRV
jurisdictions found that a majority of voters in IRV cities supported
using the system in their elections.96 Additionally, in contrast to one
of the main critiques of IRV — namely, that it tends to lead to voter
confusion — the surveys found that the vast majority of voters in

94. S.F., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102 (2002).
95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-a, § 723-A (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 96
(2018) (Cambridge’s electoral code is incorporated into Massachusetts state laws);
BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.14 (2004); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE OF
ORDINANCES art. XI, § 1105 (2018); S.F., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102
(2018); SAN LEANDRO, CAL., MUN. CODE art. II, § 225 (2018); BASALT, COLO., MUN.
CODE art. II, § 2.8 (2018); CARBONDALE, COLO., MUN. CODE art. VI, § 6-8 (2018);
PORTLAND, ME., CITY CODE OF ORDINANCES art. II, § 3 (2018); TAKOMA PARK, MD.,
MUN. CHARTER art. VI, § 606 (2018); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES
art. III, § 3.1(b) (2018); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. V, Ch. 31 (2018);
SANTA FE, N.M., MUN. CHARTER art. IV, § 4.06 (2018).
96. FairVote Survey Brief, supra note 74, at 2. Additionally, in a 2014 poll of
California cities, a majority of voters living in cities employing FPP systems
supported adopting IRV in their local elections. FAIRVOTE CALIFORNIA SURVEY,
supra note 74, at 2.
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cities utilizing IRV found that the ballot instructions were easy to
understand.97
Since these polls were conducted in 2013 and 2014, the state of
American politics has undoubtedly undergone a significant
transformation. The election of Donald Trump, who employed a noholds-barred campaign style where he ruthlessly attacked any and all
of his political opponents, has emboldened more candidates — both
Republicans and Democrats — to employ campaign strategies that
are increasingly critical of their opponents.98 There is limited data on
how much, if at all, IRV’s ability to reduce negative campaigning will
translate into a new, much more hostile political climate. The
uncertainty of these issues notwithstanding, IRV ultimately has
proven to be popular in the cities where it has been used.99
Additionally, while the claims related to campaign conduct may be
undermined by a shift in the nation’s political climate, the benefits of
IRV in terms of avoiding additional costs incurred by runoff and
primary elections likely remain valid.
Perhaps because of the success of IRV in the cities that have
already implemented it, more cities are laying the legal groundwork
for IRV in their future elections.100 Many other cities and states are

97. FAIRVOTE CALIFORNIA SURVEY, supra note 74, at 6–9; FairVote Survey Brief,
supra note 74, at 2.
98. See Susan B. Glasser, The Dark Certainty of the 2018 Midterms, NEW

YORKER (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-trumpswashington/the-dark-certainty-of-the-2018-midterms-donald-trump
[https://perma.cc/7M8T-AFDA] (noting how Trump has “redefin[ed] American
politics to suit his own explosive style”); see also, e.g., Anthea Butler, Opinion,

Democrats Will Lose in 2018 If They Don’t Shut Up About Civility and Shout About
Our
Democracy
Dying,
NBC
NEWS
(July
15,
2018),

https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/democrats-will-lose-2018-if-they-don-t-shutabout-ncna891196 [https://perma.cc/9XR3-U6VG].
99. See also MINN. CITY COUNCIL, STANDING COMM. ON ELECTIONS & RULES,
THE 2017 MUNICIPAL ELECTION: AN ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS 36–38 (May 9,
2018),
https://fairvote.app.box.com/s/zfu1gdn4zslhw5sbe5t185awzstqxfzp
[https://perma.cc/596W-J6ZE]; Chris Hughes, Minneapolis Voters Give Ranked
Choice Voting High Marks After Third RCV Election, FAIRVOTE (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.fairvote.org/minneapolis_voters_give_ranked_choice_voting_high_marks
_after_third_rcv_election [https://perma.cc/V65H-74YL]. Of course, this data may
not be broadly applicable, as the data is drawn from an unrepresentative sample —
populations that supported IRV implementation in the first place by voting to
implement it.
100. AMHERST, MASS. HOME RULE CHARTER art. 10, § 10.10 (2018); ST. LOUIS
PARK, MINN. CITY CHARTER ch. 4, § 4.08 (2018); LAS CRUCES, N.M. H.B. 98 (as
passed by legislature Mar. 7, 2018); Bennet Hall, Benton Gears Up for Ranked
Choice,
CORVALLIS
GAZETTE-TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.gazettetimes.com/news/local/benton-gears-up-for-ranked-
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also seriously considering IRV, if for no reason other than its fiscal
benefits.101 The final section of this Part discusses one such city —
New York City — and how the expense of runoff elections has
spurred calls for reform in the form of IRV.
E.

IRV Advocacy in New York City

As will be discussed in Part II, New York City has a traditional
runoff mechanism in place for primaries for three public offices:
mayor, public advocate, and comptroller.102 In these primaries, if no
candidate secures at least 40% of the vote, there is a subsequent
runoff election.103 The subsequent runoff elections, when they have
occurred, have confirmed one of the main critiques IRV advocates
posit against traditional runoff systems: they impose a significant
financial burden on the localities and states employing such a
system.104 In 2013, the Democratic primary for public advocate went
to a runoff and the ultimate cost of that election was $13 million,
while the annual budget for the office of public advocate at the time
was $2.3 million.105 Apart from the cost, another notable aspect of
the 2013 runoff election was the decreased voter turnout. The
turnout in the initial primary was 18% of the eligible voting
population, but turnout dropped to less than half of that — 7% — in
the subsequent runoff.106 Additionally, those who returned for the
runoff election tended to be older, whiter, wealthier than the initial
primary voting bloc.107

choice/article_cf6ea193-72b6-51ff-b0b9-38b1262c2e12.html [https://perma.cc/P4WX4652] (noting Benton County, Oregon’s adoption of IRV for 2020 elections).
101. Jamie Munks, Instant Runoff Voting Survives at the Polls, But Will It Be
Implemented in Memphis?, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2018/11/07/instant-runoff-votingmemphis-shelby-county-midterm-election/1858041002/
[https://perma.cc/JQ5VQRGD].
102. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018).
103. Id. For an overview of a traditional runoff voting, see supra Part I.B.
104. Kate Taylor, High-Cost Runoff for Public Advocate’s Post Prompts Calls for
Reform,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/nyregion/high-cost-runoff-for-public-advocatespost-prompts-calls-for-reform.html [https://perma.cc/MU7Y-BJWJ].
105. Id.
106. New York City Democratic Primary Runoff Turnout: Older Whiter,
Wealthier Voters, and Low Turnout Overall, FAIRVOTE (Apr. 2018),
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/NYC-Runoff-Handout [https://perma.cc/2T9Y-JZNG].
107. Id. The racial disparity in runoff voting has prompted a handful of lawsuits
challenging whether runoff elections are violations of federal law, namely the Voting
Rights Act. See infra note 202.
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The results of the 2013 runoff prompted efforts both at the state
and the city level to implement IRV in order to prevent repeating
what most saw as an incredibly costly process that could be avoided
altogether with IRV. Furthermore, advocates for IRV, likely seeing
an opportunity for a major victory in bringing IRV to New York City,
have been increasingly active in pushing for its implementation.108
At the city level, there have been efforts by local officials to
implement IRV. Perhaps most notably, the winner of the 2013 runoff
for public advocate and current New York Attorney General Letitia
James has been one of the loudest voices in the city calling for IRV.109
In addition to (now former) members of the city government like
James, non-profit advocacy groups like Common Cause New York
and FairVote have also led the charge to implement IRV in New
York City.110 Most advocates at the city level have endorsed utilizing
the Mayoral Charter Revision Commission to implement IRV to
replace primaries for the city’s three major offices through a charter
revision.111
In order to do this, the Mayoral Charter Revision
Commission could include a proposal on a November ballot to utilize
IRV in city primaries for the three offices currently using traditional
runoffs.112 Indeed, there is much discussion that the Charter Revision
Commission will heavily consider the issue in the near future.113

108. FairVote, one of the leading advocacy groups for IRV, has a dedicated section
on its website for the purpose of advocating New York City to adopt IRV. New York
City, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/new_york_city [https://perma.cc/RUS62TWN] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
109. At a rally in 2018, James said “I am the face of instant runoff,” pointing to the
fact that she won the runoff in 2013 that ended up costing far more than her office’s
annual budget, and saying IRV is the “least expensive, most democratic option” that
also forces candidates to appeal to a broader voting base. Madina Toure, In NYC,
Primary Election Runoffs Could Become a Thing of the Past, OBSERVER (May 1,
2018),
https://observer.com/2018/05/new-york-city-instant-runoff-voting/
[https://perma.cc/UDM2-Y2N4].
110. Common Cause New York’s website argues that “[IRV] can profoundly
change the voter experience, the way candidates run their elections, and has the
potential to reshape local politics.” New York City Needs Ranked Choice Voting!,
COMMON
CAUSE,
https://www.commoncause.org/new-york/our-work/votingelections/let-nyc-vote-help-bring-ranked-choice-voting-to-the-city/
[https://perma.cc/MY34-B6CK] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
111. See, e.g., JERRY H. GOLDFEDER, TESTIMONY AT THE 2019 N.Y.C. CHARTER
COMMISSION
(Sept.
27,
2018)
(transcript
available
at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2018435CharterRevisionVotingTestimony092718.pdf) [https://perma.cc/X5A8-JPHQ] (“The
City of New York has the authority to enact [IRV] in municipal elections, as
articulated by various experts and disinterested parties.”).
112. Id.; see Murray Seasongood, The New York City Charter, 51 HARV. L. REV.
948, 948–49 (1938) (book review); see also Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City
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However, the charter revision route largely ignores the fact that §
6-162 — the state election law requiring runoffs in city primaries —
would likely preempt any change New York City makes to its
mayoral, public advocate, or comptroller primary elections.114
Perhaps recognizing this obstacle, multiple state assemblymen and
senators have introduced legislation in the state legislature to
implement IRV in New York City primaries.115 The proposed
amendments, which have been largely identical to each other, would
change § 6-162 to read, in relevant part: “In the city of New York, any
city-wide primary elections for the office of mayor, public advocate or
comptroller, in which more than two candidates appear on the ballot
for the same office, shall be conducted by instant run-off voting.”116
While there have been multiple attempts at passing legislation
including this language, these attempts have all stalled before
reaching the governor’s desk for signature. 117 However, the politics
in New York State changed dramatically after the 2018 elections, as
Democrats, who have been far more active than state Republicans in
advocating for IRV, took control of the state senate and now control
both legislative chambers.118 Indeed, among the first bills introduced
in the state legislature at the beginning of the 2019 legislative session
was a bill with language identical to that of previously introduced
legislation.119 The following Part examines the dynamic between city
and state laws in New York, Election Law § 6-162, and how § 6-162
complicates New York City’s efforts to implement IRV.

Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion Cap Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy
Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L. REV. 807, 828–29 (2013).
113. Ben Brachfeld, With Nod from De Blasio and Push from Johnson,
Momentum for Ranked-Choice Voting in New York City, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov.

9, 2018), http://www.gothamgazette.com/city/8062-with-nod-from-de-blasio-and-pushfrom-johnson-momentum-for-ranked-choice-voting-in-new-york-city
[https://perma.cc/2PNM-CESW].
114. See infra Part II.
115. A.B. 7013A, 2013–14 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); see also Taylor, supra note 104.
116. S.B. 3309, 2017–18 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
117. See, e.g., S.B. 3309, 2017–18 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); A.B. 5752, 2017–18 Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 6862, 2015–16 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); A.B. 5571, 2015–16 Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
118. See McKinley & Goldmacher, supra note 23.
119. S.B. 2517 2018–19 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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II. HOME (RULE) IS WHERE THE HEART IS: NEW YORK’S
ELECTION LAW AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF IMPLEMENTING
IRV IN NEW YORK CITY
New York City has, on many occasions, regulated elections in a
manner that differs from New York State’s Election Law. For
example, New York City amended its charter to establish term limits
on the number of consecutive terms that various elected officials
could serve, even though the state election law imposed no such
limits.120 In another example, New York City imposed campaign
contribution limits that were more restrictive than state contribution
limits under New York Election Law § 14-114.121 In both of these
examples, the City’s move to deviate from state election law survived
judicial scrutiny.122 Given a history of judicial deference to New York
City’s unilateral deviations from state election law, unilaterally
implementing IRV through a revision to the City Charter would
appear to be a perfectly acceptable move by the city. Indeed, as
voices within New York City calling for IRV have grown louder, most
seem to believe that a Charter Revision is all it takes to implement
IRV.123
But this belief is incorrect. Because New York State law mandates
a runoff for three of the most important primary elections in New
York City, implementing IRV is distinguishable from the previously
mentioned examples in that it would contradict, not supplement, state
law.124 Through a general overview of the relevant law in this area,
this Part will demonstrate this point. Section II.A.i provides a general
overview of home rule in New York, with a focus on how the doctrine
of preemption is generally applied. Section II.A.ii examines a less
discussed aspect of New York home rule — preemption via special
law — and § 6-162 of New York’s Elections Law, which mandates a
runoff in New York City’s primary elections for mayor, comptroller,
and public advocate. Section II.B.i analyzes the legislative history of,
and legal challenges to, § 6-162. Lastly, Section II.B.ii focuses
specifically on New York City and examines the impact of § 6-162 on

120. Roth v. Cuevas, 158 Misc. 2d 238, 240 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 197 A.D.2d
369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 624 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1993).
121. McDonald v. New York City Campaign Fin. Bd., 117 A.D.3d 540, 541 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
122. Id. at 540; Roth, 158 Misc. 2d at 240.
123. See, e.g., Background, N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION,
https://www.charter2019.nyc/background [https://perma.cc/ERS3-9K3J] (last visited
Oct. 16, 2019); GOLDFEDER, supra note 111.
124. Supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
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its ability to regulate its local elections, and examine the challenges
New York City will face when implementing IRV due to interplay of
§ 6-162, New York home rule, and existing case law.
A. HOME RULE IN NEW YORK

i.

Preemption Generally

In the same fashion that the U.S. Constitution delegates certain
powers (including election regulation125) to the states,126 most states
delegate certain powers to local municipalities to pass their own laws
without approval from the state legislature.127 This legal structure is
known as “home rule.”128 Just as the Tenth Amendment presents the
U.S. Supreme Court with questions about exactly what powers are
reserved by the states under the Constitution,129 state courts face
similar questions in the context of home rule.130 In New York, home
rule is both a constitutional and statutory construct.131 Article IX of
the New York Constitution132 provides a “bill of rights” for the state’s
localities, recognizing that localities need the ability to pass laws that
regulate matters of strictly local concern, and mandates the legislature
enact laws “granting to local governments powers including but not

125. See supra note 25.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
127. JON D. RUSSELL & AARON BOSTROM, FEDERALISM, DILLION RULE AND
HOME RULE 6–9 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCEWhite-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7GA-AYYU] (noting
that 44 states currently provide for home rule); see also David J. Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003).
128. See DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE
HANDBOOK 11–12 (2001); Su, supra note 13, at 181–82.
129. This has been especially true in recent decades, where Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence has reemerged at the Supreme Court, starting in 1991 with Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). See also New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(finding it unconstitutional for Congress to compel state legislatures to adopt laws or
other regulatory schemes). More recently, the Court expanded the reach of the Tenth
Amendment in Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, where the Court held that
Congress could not prohibit states from legalizing and regulating sports betting. 138
S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018).
130. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1963).
131. N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
132. Article IX was not an original component of New York’s Constitution, it was
incorporated into the state constitution through amendments in 1963. See Note,
Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1966)
[hereinafter Home Rule].
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limited to those of local legislation and administration in addition to
the powers vested in them by [Article IX].”133 Pursuant to this
mandate, the legislature enacted the New York Municipal Home
Rule Law (MHRL) in 1964.134 MHRL provides in pertinent part that:
(i) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or
any general law relating to its property, affairs or government and,
(ii) every local government, as provided in this chapter, shall have
power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the
provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general
law, relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to
the property, affairs or government of such local government, except
to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a
local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government
of such local government:
a. A county, city, town or village:
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of
selection and removal, terms of office, compensation, hours of
work, protection, welfare and safety of its officers and
employees, except that cities and towns shall not have such
power with respect to members of the legislative body of the
county in their capacities as county officers. This provision shall
include but not be limited to the creation or discontinuance of
departments of its government and the prescription or
modification of their powers and duties.135

MHRL has two basic components.136 The first restricts the ability
of the State to interfere in local affairs by passing laws that apply to
one or more localities, but not to others.137 The second component
affirmatively grants localities the power to regulate their local affairs,
as long as those local laws are not inconsistent with any of the State’s

133. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
134. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW (1964). For a more in-depth discussion about the
history of home rule in New York, see generally Home Rule, supra note 132.
135. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 2, § 10(1)(i)-(ii)(a)(1)-(2) (1964). New
York’s constitution also provides a mechanism by which the state legislature can
grant additional powers to cities that may not necessarily have initially fallen within
the realm of the home rule provision. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“[The state
legislature] [s]hall have the power to confer on local governments powers not relating
to their property, affairs or government including but not limited to those of local
legislation and administration, in addition to those otherwise granted by or pursuant
to this article, and to withdraw or restrict such additional powers.”).
136. See generally James D. Cole, Local Authority Supersede State Statutes, N.Y.
ST. B.J., Oct. 1991, at 34.
137. Id.
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general laws or the State Constitution.138 “General law” is a term of
art, defined specifically within MHRL as “[a] state statute which in
terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than
those wholly included within a city, all towns or all villages.”139 By
contrast, a “special law” is “[a] state statute which in terms and in
effect applies to one or more, but not all, counties, counties other
than those wholly included within a city, cities, towns or villages.”140
For example, a state law that regulates activity as a whole within the
state — as the majority of state legislation does — is a “general
law.”141 By contrast, a state law only targeting a locality such as New
York City is a “special law.”142 If the state wishes to regulate the
purely local affairs, it must either do so via a general law that applies
to all of the State’s localities, or, if it wishes to regulate the purely
local affair of some localities but not others, it must do so via a special
law.143 However, passing a special law is a procedurally distinct
process from passing a general law, a distinction that is explored in
more depth in Section A.2.
Turning from the state perspective to the local perspective, while
localities have the power to pass some local laws, that power is
significantly limited.144 Local governments can only pass laws that are
138. Id.
139. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. I, § 2(5) (1964).
140. Id. § 2(12).
141. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cent. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Prendergast, 194, 95 N.E. 715,
717 (N.Y. 1911) (holding tort damages statute was general law, “for it applies to
awards made pursuant to any statute of the state for damages sustained by reason of
any change of grade of any street, avenue, or road in the state[]” as opposed to roads
in a specific locality). Cf. Osborn v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 289, 289–90 (N.Y. 1936)
(holding law targeting emergency services in cities with a population over one million
not a general law, because law had the effect of only targeting New York City).
142. See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 993 N.E.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 2013)
(defining the “HAIL Act,” a state law which implemented new regulations for New
York City yellow cabs, as a special law).
143. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1).
144. This limitation has been heavily discussed by scholars who argue that home
rule in all states, not just New York, is being eroded — with localities wielding less
and less autonomy over matters of local concern. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263 (2003) (“[C]urrent rules of American
local government law produce a form of home rule that assumes and reinforces a
view of private property that disables local communities from promoting a different
kind of development.”); Su, supra note 13, at 193 (“[A]s the response to the recent
municipal activism illustrates, local policymaking is still largely seen as a novelty.
States continue to believe that they are entitled to block or overturn local laws, and
micromanage the policy areas that cities and other localities can address.”); see also
Sarah L. Swan, Preempting Plaintiff Cities, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1241 (2018)
(discussing state’s regulatory preemption of cities but their converse “limited appetite
for preempting plaintiff city litigation”).
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“not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not
inconsistent with any general law.”145 This means a locality cannot
pass laws that are “preempted” by state law.146 New York State can
preempt local laws in two ways. First, under what is known as
“conflict preemption,” a local law is preempted where a local
government passes a law directly conflicting with New York State
law.147 Put simply, local law cannot prohibit what state law expressly
allows, or conversely, local law cannot allow what state law expressly
prohibits.148 For example, New York State law prohibits the sale of
tobacco products to individuals under the age of eighteen.149 If a
locality passed legislation that prohibited the sale of tobacco products
to only those under the age of 16, such a law would directly conflict
with state law and would thus be preempted. However, where a
locality chooses to prohibit the purchase of tobacco products to those
under the age of 21, as New York City has,150 such a law is not in
conflict with existing state law, as localities can impose additional
layers of regulation that expand existing state law.151 Issues of
conflict preemption are usually straightforward, in that it will usually
be obvious based on the plain language of the state and local statutes
that they conflict with each other.152 Legal challenges to state laws
conflicting with local laws typically allege that the state does not have
the ability to expressly preempt a local law in a given field because
MHRL has reserved regulation of that issue to local governments
rather than the state.153 Put more simply, it is usually clear whether a
local statute is facially conflict preempted. Instead, the issue is

145. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)-(ii) (1964).
146. See generally Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007).
147. DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 189–190 (N.Y. 2001).
148. Chwick v. Mulvey, 81 A.D.3d 161, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
149. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-cc(1) (2014).
150. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 191 Int. No. 1076-A (2017).
151. See, e.g., Roth v. Cuevas, 624 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1993) (New York City law
imposing term limits in addition to those mandated by state law not preempted);
McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 117 A.D.3d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
(New York City Law imposing campaign contribution limits in addition to state
campaign contribution limits not preempted).
152. See, e.g., Highway Superintendent Ass’n of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 150 A.D.3d 731, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (conflict preemption where
local law required “approval of the town board” to appoint employees to repair or
maintain highways, while state law vested such power solely in the Highway
Superintendent).
153. E.g., Osborn v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 289, 289–90 (N.Y. 1936).
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typically whether the state has the authority to expressly preempt
local law in the given sphere.154
Local laws can also be field preempted, and the issue of whether or
not a local law is field preempted is more complex than issues of
conflict preemption. Field preemption occurs where the state
legislature “has clearly evinced a desire to preempt an entire field
thereby precluding any further local regulation.”155 Field preemption
can occur in three ways: (1) expressly — where the relevant State
statute expressly states that it “preempts all local laws on the same
matter”;156 (2) implicitly through a policy declaration — where “a
declaration of State policy evinces the intent of the [l]egislature to
preempt local laws on the same subject matter”;157 or (3) implicitly
through a detailed regulatory scheme — where field preemption is
implied due to “the [l]egislature’s enactment of a comprehensive and
detailed regulatory scheme” in the field at issue.158 Where a court
determines that a given field has been preempted by the state, a local
law in that field is considered inconsistent with state law because it
either (1) prohibits conduct that the state legislature would consider
acceptable, or at least does not proscribe; or (2) additionally restricts
rights granted by the state.159 For example, in Consolidated Edison v.
Town of Red Hook, the New York Court of Appeals found that a
local law was field preempted because it prohibited conduct that
would have otherwise been acceptable under a general state law.160
In that case, Con Edison, a power company that operates in the state,
announced a plan to study the possibility of opening a new power
plant in one of two towns.161 One of those towns, Red Hook, quickly
passed a law that requiring that any company seeking to study a site
within the town would need to acquire a license from the town, which
required the company to pay a fee and submit detailed data reports to

154. See, e.g., id.
155. Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk Cty., 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1987).
156. Chwick v. Mulvey, 81 A.D.3d 161, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see, e.g., DJL
Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186 (N.Y. 2001).
157. Chwick, 81 A.D.3d at 169; see, e.g., Robin v. Inc. Vil. of Hempstead, 285
N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1972).
158. Chwick, at 169–70; see, e.g., New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York,
505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987); People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981).
159. Jancyn Mfg. Corp., 518 N.E.2d at 905. However, “the mere fact that both the
State and local government seek to regulate the same subject matter does not, in and
of itself, render the local legislation invalid on preemption grounds.” Ba Mar, Inc. v.
Cty. of Rockland, 164 A.D.2d 605, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
160. 456 N.E.2d 487, 491 (N.Y. 1983).
161. Id. at 488.
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the town, and gave the town the authority to deny the license if it
determined that the proposed activities would be detrimental to the
town and its residents.162 However, the state had previously enacted
legislation creating a board that would ultimately decide whether a
facility should be built on a given site, a decision-making process that
included weighing the interests of the town containing the site.163
Because of this, the court found that Red Hook’s local law was field
preempted by the state.164

ii.

Special Laws: The Home Rule Message Requirement and
Preemption

The discussion of preemption by courts and academics typically
concerns local laws conflicting with general laws or the New York
State Constitution. Where a special law is concerned, a preemption
challenge is rarely raised. A “special law,” which is a law targeting
specific localities rather than the state as a whole, has a procedurally
distinct enactment process prescribed by the State Constitution.
Article IX provides that the state legislature:
Shall have the power to act in relation to the property, affairs or
government of any local government only by general law, or by
special law only (a) on request of two-thirds of the total membership
of its legislative body or on request of its chief executive officer
concurred in by a majority of such membership, or (b), except in the
case of the city of New York, on certificate of necessity from the
governor reciting facts which in the judgment of the governor
constitute an emergency requiring enactment of such law and, in
such latter case, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members
elected to each house of the legislature.165

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 490. The court also noted that “[t]he intent to pre-empt need not be
express[,] [i]t is enough that the Legislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do
so[,]” and pointing to the regulatory structure the state implemented in order to
implement the legislation, id., placing this case in the third category of field
preemption.
165. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). MHRL supplements this requirement:
The elective or appointive chief executive officer, if there be one, or
otherwise the chairman of the board of supervisors, in the case of a county,
the mayor in the case of a city or village or the supervisor in the case of a
town with the concurrence of the legislative body of such local government,
or the legislative body by a vote of two-thirds of its total voting power
without the approval of such officer, may request the legislature to pass a
specific bill relating to the property, affairs or government of such local
government which does not in terms and in effect apply alike to all counties,
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Preemption issues involving special laws are less common than
those involving general laws.166 Rather, issues involving special laws
usually come up where the state passes legislation that touches on
issues of local concern without a “home rule message” by the locality,
as required by Article IX.167 A valid home rule message is “sent”
when (1) two-thirds of a local legislature vote to request legislation
from the state; (2) the chief executive of a given locality along with a
majority of that localities legislature vote to request legislation from
the state; or (3) New York’s Governor declares a valid emergency
and two-thirds of both houses of the State Legislature concur.168 In
cases where there is no home rule message, those challenging the law
will urge the court to construe the law as a special law and then
invalidate the law as procedurally unconstitutional.169 However, even
where a law is properly classified as a special law, there is no
requirement that the locality send a home rule message where the
special law also touches on a “matter of state concern.”170 Because of
this exception, courts often must grapple with whether the law is one
that concerns only local affairs, or also involves a matter of state

all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all
towns or all villages, as the case may be. Such a request may be made
separately by two or more local governments affected by the same bill.
Every such request shall declare that a necessity exists for the passage of
such bill by the legislature and shall recite the facts establishing such
necessity. The form of request and the manner of its communication to the
legislature shall conform to rules promulgated by concurrent resolution of
the senate and assembly pursuant to article three-A of the legislative law. In
adopting such a request the legislative body shall be governed by the
provisions of subdivision one of section twenty of this chapter with regard to
the adoption of a local law. The validity of an act passed by the legislature in
accordance with such a request shall not be subject to review by the courts
on the ground that the necessity alleged in the request did not exist or was
not properly established by the facts recited.
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 40 (1964).
166. This is because, contrary to general laws, localities have some authority to
supersede special laws. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
167. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1).
168. Id. The third option, which does not involve the locality, cannot be used to
apply special laws to New York City, which the Constitution explicitly exempts from
this procedure.
169. See, e.g., City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of New York, Inc.
(“PBA I”), 676 N.E.2d 847, 850 (N.Y. 1996); Matter of Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d
908, 912 (N.Y. 1982).
170. See Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. City of New York (PBA
II), 767 N.E.2d 116, 120 (N.Y. 2001) (“Thus, a special law that relates to the property,
affairs or government of a locality is constitutional only if enacted upon a home rule
message or the provision bears a direct and reasonable relationship to a substantial
State concern.”).
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concern.171 The notion of “a matter of state concern” derives from an
influential 1929 New York Court of Appeals decision, Alder v.
Deegan, in which the court set out to define what was encompassed
by “property, affairs or government” of any local government, the
regulation of which triggers the protections of Article IX.172 The case
is most notable for Judge Cardozo’s concurrence, in which he framed
the test for determining whether something is a matter of state
concern: “[I]f the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State
concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are
concerns of the locality.”173 “Substantial degree,” as developed
through subsequent case law, means that a special law that does not
comply with the Constitution’s home rule requirements must “serve a
supervening State concern,”174 and “relate to life, health, and the
quality of life [of the People of the State].”175 Additionally, the
substantial state concern cannot be derived “purely from speculative
assertions on possible State-wide implication of the subject matter,
having no support in the language, structure or legislative history of
the statute.”176
As a result of Alder and New York’s subsequent case law, if a
court finds that the law involves a matter of State concern, any
argument that the law is a procedurally invalid special law falls to the
wayside, as a special law triggers the home rule message requirement
only where it regulates matters of purely local concern.177 Perhaps
171. See, e.g., PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 850.
172. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929); see James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in
New York: “The Ghost of Home Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 715–19
(discussing the implications of Alder in the broader context of home rule in New
York). The law at issue in Alder was whether a state law regulating tenement houses
only in New York City was constitutional. Alder, 167 N.E. at 706. The purpose of the
law, the court found, was to ensure that conditions in New York City housing were
suitable for living. Id. at 710. The court reasoned that this was a matter of public
health, which was within the state’s police power because public health concerned the
entire state, rather than just New York City. Id. at 709. Because health concerns did
not fall into the category of matters of strictly local concern, the fact that the State
law could be classified as special made no difference, because the home rule
provisions of the New York Constitution only protect local governments from State
legislation regulating matters of strictly local concern. Id.
173. Alder, 167 N.E. at 705 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
174. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1977).
175. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of New York, Inc. (PBA I),
676 N.E.2d 847, 852 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Wambat Realty Corp., 362 N.E.2d at 585)
(alterations in original).
176. Id.
177. The New York Court of Appeals has at times classified matters of local
concern that also involve matters of state concern as “an exception” to the home rule
procedural requirements for enacting special laws. PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 850 (citing
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predictably, how courts determine matters of state concern is
extremely consequential, as too broad of an interpretation has the
potential to swallow home rule in its entirety.178
Returning to the issue of preemption, having briefly discussed
special laws, New York courts have held that, in general, a locality
can pass legislation superseding a special law.179 The reasoning

Matter of Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1982)); see also Patrolmen’s Benev.
Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. City of New York (PBA II), 767 N.E.2d 116, 120 (N.Y.
2001) (“Thus, a special law that relates to the property, affairs or government of a
locality is constitutional only if enacted upon a home rule message or the provision
bears a direct and reasonable relationship to a substantial State concern.” (internal
quotations omitted) (alteration in original)). But the use of the language “exception”
was not always how special laws were understood. In Matter of Kelley — which the
Court in PBA quotes in support of its classification of state interests as an
“exception” to the procedural requirements of a special law — the court never
classified the state interest as an exception. 443 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1982). In that case,
the Court rejected the argument that the law at issue was a special law. Id. at 913
(“The counties argue that the statute is invalid as a ‘special law’ . . . . This argument,
however, misperceives the nature of the authority under which the Legislature has
acted.”). The court in Matter of Kelley clarified that “[o]nce a statute is found to
involve an appropriate level of State interest, the fact that it effects a classification
among the local governments it regulates does not render the enactment invalid, so
long as that classification is related and related to the State’s purpose.” Id. at 915. The
first step in the analysis is “whether a challenged statute involves a matter other than
the property, affairs or government of a municipality.” Id. at 913. Reading this in
conjunction with the text of Article IX, the procedural requirements of § 2(b) kick in
only where the matter is one that solely concerns local property, affairs, or
government. If matter involves concerns beyond local interests, § 2(b) is no longer
applicable. See Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 473 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1984) (“The
limitation upon the power of the Legislature to act by special law in relation to the
property, affairs or government of a local government contained in article IX (§ 2,
par. [b], cl. [2] ) of the New York Constitution must be read together with section 3
(par. [a], cl. [3] ) of the same article, which declares that, ‘Except as expressly
provided, nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in
relation to: . . . [m]atters other than the property, affairs or government of a local
government.’ So read the limitation applies only to a special law which is directly

concerned with the property, affairs or government of a local government and
unrelated to a matter of proper concern to State government.” (emphasis added)
(alterations in original)); see also Hotel Dorset Co. v. Tr. for Cultural Res. of New

York, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (N.Y. 1978) (“If the subject matter of the legislation is
of sufficient importance to the State generally, the legislation cannot be deemed a
local law even though it deals directly with the affairs of a municipality.”). Based on
the text of Article IX and its subsequent interpretations, it would seem to follow that
a law that is both a special law and one that touches on matters of state concern is an
oxymoron. However, the Court of Appeals has changed its understanding in recent
decades and now understands there to be two kinds of special laws: ones that involve
matters of purely local concern and ones that involve matters of both local and state
concern. See, e.g., PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 120; PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 850.
178. See infra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.
179. “There is no . . . requirement that a local law be consistent with a ‘special law’
enacted by the Legislature. A ‘special law’ may thus be superseded by a validly
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emerges from the text of MHRL § 10, which states in part that “every
local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not
inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent
with any general law relating to its property, affairs or
government.”180 Because this section only refers to general laws,
courts have interpreted this as allowing local laws that are
inconsistent with special laws.181
Despite this, MHRL § 34 does impose certain restrictions on a
locality’s ability to supersede special laws.182 While § 34 includes

enacted local law.” Gizzo v. Town of Mamaroneck, 36 A.D.3d 162, 165 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006); see also Ricket v. Mahan, 97 A.D.3d 1062, 1063 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012);
Landmark Colony at Oyster Bay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 113 A.D.2d 741, 741 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985). Some have said that special laws that also involve matters of state
concern preempt localities to which that special law does not apply from passing local
laws that are inconsistent with that special law. But existing case law does not support
this interpretation of the law. In an article appearing in the New York Law Journal,
the author claimed that preemption “has been construed also to bar local legislation
that is inconsistent with special laws (i.e., laws applying to specified municipalities but
not to the entire state) where those laws touch on matters of state concern.” Jeffrey
D. Friedlander, Setting Limits: Litigation Between Mayor, City Council, N.Y. L. J.
(Mar.
7,
2008),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/ar3708.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7GA-AYYU]. In support of this statement of the law, the author
cites to two cases. The first, DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, was a case where
the issue was whether the State’s Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Law field
preempted a city zoning law regulating the location of “adult establishments.” 749
N.E.2d 186 (N.Y. 2001). The case had absolutely nothing to do with special laws or
what constitutes a matter of state concern. Indeed, neither “special law” nor “state
concern” is mentioned once throughout the opinion. The second case, Matter of
Slominski v. Rutkowski, did not concern preemption whatsoever, instead it
concerned a county executive’s refusal to certify the need to fill certain vacancies
within the county government, pursuant to the county charter. 91 A.D.2d 202, 203
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
180. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (2018).
181. See, e.g., Ricket, 97 A.D.3d at 1063. For those interested in such things, this
reading of the text subscribes to the “omitted-case canon,” or “casus omissus canon,”
which is “[t]he doctrine that nothing is to be added to what a legal instrument states
or reasonably implies; the principle that a matter not covered is to be treated as not
covered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93–100
(1st ed. 2012).
182. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34 (2019). In Baldwin Union Free School
District v. County of Nassau, the New York Court of Appeals spoke on the issue. 9
N.E.3d 351 (N.Y. 2014). In that case, the court was presented with the question of
whether a county could pass a local law that shifted the obligation to pay property tax
refunds from the county to its individual taxing districts, which superseded a special
state tax law. Id. at 353. Nassau County adopted an alternative form of government in
the early 20th century that was established by state legislation and acquired its
charter and local legislative powers via a state-drafted charter, thus it lacked the
ability in many areas to unilaterally amend its charter — which included its tax code.
Id. at 354. The County, in order to change its tax code, petitioned the State through a
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many limitations,183 the limitation that is important for the purposes
of this Note is found in § 34(3)(g), which prohibits localities from
superseding the state’s Election Law, regardless of whether the
pertinent local election law is general or special.184 The importance of
this restriction will become apparent in the following section, which
will discuss New York Election Law § 6-162 and how it complicates
New York City’s ability to amend its charter and unilaterally
implement IRV.
B. The Intersection of State and Local Election Law: § 6-162

i.

The History of § 6-162

New York’s Election Law, enacted as a general law in 1909, first
sought to establish boards of elections in the state’s counties.185

home rule message pursuant to Article IX of the Constitution. Id. at 355. The state
subsequently enacted the requested legislation, but some decades later, the County
sought to unilaterally amend its tax code. Id. at 354–57. The court held that even
though the County’s tax code was a special law, because it concerned “the
distribution of the proceeds of taxes or benefit assessments” (quoting N.Y. MUN.
HOME RULE LAW § 34(3)(a)), the law could only be amended by the county
“pursuant to an express and unambiguous delegation of authority by the state
legislature.” Id. at 356, 361.
183. The exemption includes any law:
Which relates to the imposition, judicial review or distribution of the
proceeds of taxes or benefit assessments; Insofar as it relates to the
educational system in the county or to school districts therein, except that
functions, powers or duties assigned to units of local government or to
agencies or officers thereof outside the educational system may be
transferred to other units of local government, agencies or officers as
authorized by [§ 34]; Which requires that specified functions of government
be performed by or financed by units of local government, except that any
of such functions may be transferred to other units of local government,
agencies or officers as authorized by this article; Insofar as it relates to a
function, power or duty of the state or of any officer or agency thereof
which is financed directly by the state; Insofar as it relates to the
commencement or prosecution of actions or proceedings against the county;
Insofar as it relates to a public benefit corporation; In this chapter or in the
civil service law, eminent domain procedure law, environmental
conservation law, election law, executive law, judiciary law, labor law, local
finance law, multiple dwelling law, multiple residence law, public authorities
law, public housing law, public service law, railroad law, retirement and
social security law, state finance law, volunteer firefighters’ benefit law,
volunteer ambulance workers’ benefit law, or workers’ compensation law.
N.Y MUN. HOME RULE LAW §§ 34(3)(a)–(g).
184. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34(3)(g).
185. One New York court gave the following historical description of New York’s
Election Law:
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Today, it covers many aspects of elections taking place within the
state at all levels.186 The story of the relevant portion of New York’s
Election Law for purposes of this discussion — § 6-162 — begins in
the late 1960s. The 1969 mayoral election in New York City was an
unusual one. In the Democratic primary, Herman Badillo and
Robert Wagner received 28% and 29% of the vote, respectively.187
This allowed a third Democratic candidate, Mario Proccacino, to win
the nomination with 33% of the votes.188 Proccacino would go on to
lose the general election to incumbent John Lindsay.189 Democrats,
who held a significant majority in the state and city legislature, felt
that they had lost the mayoral race because their two strongest
candidates, Badillo and Wagner, had split the vote and allowed
Proccacino, a less popular candidate, to emerge as a weaker
Democratic nominee, thus handing the election to Lindsay.190
A few years later in 1972, Democratic State Assemblymen Stanley
Steingut and Albert Blumenthal sponsored a bill that would create a
primary runoff mechanism for primaries in New York City.191
Proponents of the bill argued that “it was designed to avoid a repeat
of the 1969 ‘fluke’ Proccacino result, when a candidate who clearly

The Election Law which this act amends is a general law. As originally
enacted by chapter 22 of the Laws of 1909, it provided for a board of
elections in cities of the first class containing one or more counties (the city
of New York), and for a single commissioner of elections in each of the
counties of Erie, Monroe, Onondaga, and Westchester. It vested in the
individual commissioners, respectively, of the counties named, powers and
duties similar in some respects to those of this Niagara county act.
Vroman v. Fish, 181 A.D. 502, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
186. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-102 (2005) (“This chapter shall govern the conduct of
all elections at which voters of the state of New York may cast a ballot for the
purpose of electing an individual to any party position or nominating or electing an
individual to any federal, state, county, city, town or village office, or deciding any
ballot question submitted to all the voters of the state or the voters of any county or
city, or deciding any ballot question submitted to the voters of any town or village at
the time of a general election. Where a specific provision of law exists in any other
law which is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, such provision shall
apply unless a provision of this chapter specifies that such provision of this chapter
shall apply notwithstanding any other provision of law.”).
187. Butts v. City of New York (Butts II), 779 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
Robert B. McKay, Butts v. City of New York: Race, Politics and the Run-Off
Primary, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 499, 501 (1987).
188. Butts II, 779 F.2d at 143. It is worth noting here that this is an excellent
example of the results traditional runoffs and IRV are designed to prevent. See supra
Section I.D.
189. Butts II, 779 F.2d at 143.
190. Id. at 143.
191. Id. at 143.
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did not represent the views of a majority of the members of his party
secured the nomination because of the vicissitudes of vote
division.”192 Those who opposed the bill were concerned that a
runoff mechanism would disproportionately dilute the minority
vote.193 Additionally, there was also a deep suspicion that § 6-162 had
racist motivations and was to intended to prevent Harman Badillo,
the first Puerto Rican to run for citywide office, from securing a
victory in a future election, as the bill became known in Albany
circles as the “Badillo bill.”194 Nonetheless, the bill easily passed the
State Senate, 49 votes to 8, as well as the State Assembly, 104 votes to
5, and was signed into law by Governor Rockefeller as New York
Election Law § 131-a in 1972.195 At the time it was signed into law, §
131-a applied to all cities in New York with a population above one
million people. Yet, in 1972, the only city that met this criterion was
New York City.196 The law was amended in 1976 and then again in
1978 to include its current, New York City-specific language and
become New York Election Law § 6-162.197 It was last amended in
1993, to reflect the change in title for leader of the City Council from
“President” to “Public Advocate.”198 However, in a 2002 charter
revision, the duties of the public advocate were transferred to the

192. Id. at 143–44.
193. Id. at 144. This was the issue that would ultimately be the grounds for the
Voting Rights Act challenge to § 6-162. Infra note 202. These same concerns continue
to be raised by skeptics of IRV. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
194. Butts v. City of New York (Butts I), 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev’d, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985).
195. Butts I, 614 F. Supp. at 1550; see also McKay, supra note 187, at 501.
196. § 131-a stated:
Any inconsistent provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, in cities
having a population of one million or more, in any case in which no
candidate for the office of mayor, city council president or comptroller
receives forty percent or more of the votes cast by the members of a
political party for such office in a city-wide primary election, the board of
elections of such city shall conduct a run-off primary election between the
two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes for the same office.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 131-a (1972).
197. N.Y. ELEC. LAW art. I, § 6-162 (2018). Section 6-160, which has no runoff
mechanism, applies to all primary elections in the state outside of New York City.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-160 (2018) (“If more candidates are designated for the
nomination of a party for an office to be filled by the voters of the entire state than
there are vacancies, the nomination or nominations of the party shall be made at the
primary election at which other candidates for public office are nominated and the
candidate or candidates receiving the most votes shall be the nominees of the
party.”). This is a simple FPP system for primaries. See supra Section I.A.
198. 1993 ch. 418. N.Y. Laws 8131.
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Council Speaker.199 Section 6-162 now prescribes the procedure for
runoff elections in arguably the most important New York City
primaries in the event no candidate receives at least 40% of the
vote.200 Subsection (1) states:
In the City of New York, when no candidate for the office of mayor,
public advocate, or comptroller receives forty percent or more of
the votes cast by the members of a political party for such office in
a city-wide primary election, the board of elections of such city shall
conduct a run-off primary election between the two candidates
receiving the greatest number of votes for the same office.201

The next section discusses the various legal challenges § 6-162
faced after its enactment and how courts, both state and federal, have
interpreted § 6-162.

ii.

Legal Challenges to § 6-162

Since its inception, § 6-162 of New York’s Election Law has faced a
variety of legal challenges.202 Most relevant to the focus of this Note
was an initial challenge to § 6-162 (codified as § 131-a at the time) on
the grounds that it violated New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law.
In Procaccino v. Board of Elections of the City of New York,203
plaintiff Mario Proccacino, whose primary victory spurred the state

199. See Diane Cardwell, Betsy Gotbaum, the Advocate, Struggles to Reach Her
Public,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
2,
2002),

https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/02/nyregion/betsy-gotbaum-the-advocate-strugglesto-reach-her-public.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
[https://perma.cc/L36D-TJEQ]
(“A charter proposal backed by Mayor Bloomberg and passed on Nov. 5 has already
stripped the public advocate of one role, serving as presiding officer of the City
Council.”).
200. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162.
201. Id.
202. One such challenge was under the Voting Rights Act, where minority
candidates argued that runoff elections had both the purpose and effect of diluting
the minority vote in New York City, an argument the Southern District of New York
found convincing. Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
However, the Southern District’s decision was overturned on appeal by the Second
Circuit. Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Oakes
dissented, however, finding that because the effect of § 6-162 was discriminatory, the
question of purpose was irrelevant to the ultimate question of whether there was a
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Id. at 151 (Oakes,
J., dissenting); see also Arnold H. Lubasch, City Runoff in Primaries is Upheld, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/14/nyregion/city-runoff-inprimaries-is-upheld.html [https://perma.cc/BU5W-QFBX]. For a more in-depth
discussion of the Voting Rights Act and runoff elections, see generally Matthew G.
McGuire, Note, Assessing the Legality of Runoff Elections Under the Voting Rights
Act, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 876 (1986); Ballard, supra note 46
203. 73 Misc. 2d 462 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1973).
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legislature to enact § 6-162 just three years earlier, challenged the
provision on the grounds that it violated Article IX of the State
Constitution, because § 6-162 was a special law enacted absent a
home rule message and did not involve a matter of state concern.204
The court agreed that § 6-162 was a special law, but held that primary
elections for certain New York City offices were matters of state
concern, thereby exempting § 6-162 from the home rule message
requirement.205 This opinion was notable for both its discussion of a
special election law’s preemption effects, as well its broad
construction of what constitutes an issue of statewide concern. The
court first addressed the question of whether or not § 6-162 was a
special law, which was not immediately clear, because, at its
inception, § 6-162 did not explicitly name New York City in its
application.206 Looking to the test employed by Judge Cardozo in In
re Elm St. in City of New York,207 under which a law that applies to
populations (i.e., cities with a population over 1 million) “only to
designate and identify the place to be affected” is considered a local
law and therefore can only be enacted by the state via special law, the
court concluded that § 6-162 was indeed a special law.208
Although it classified § 6-162 as a special law, the court held that it
did not violate the home rule message requirements of Article IX
because, under Alder, it sufficiently touched on a matter of state
concern.209 The court’s application of Alder is worth reading in its
entirety:
[I]t may be concluded that the legislative enactment under
consideration does not conflict with article IX of the State
Constitution, because it clearly relates to a matter of State concern
and the run-off procedure delineated therein is part of the election
process (see Matter of Devoe v. Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Colonie. 11
A.D.2d 602). In positioning this conclusion on the basis of State
concern, the force of section 1 of article IX of the State Constitution
lends itself in pertinent part: “Effective local self-government and
intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of the
state”.
This declaration significantly forms the policy basis

204. See id. at 463. Procaccino also challenged § 6-162 on the grounds that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, id. at 469, but this
aspect of this case is not relevant for the purposes of this Note.
205. Id. at 468–69.
206. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 131-a (1972); see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
207. 158 N.E. 24 (N.Y. 1927).
208. See Procaccino, 73 Misc. 2d at 468 (finding “no doubt that the act is special
and not general”).
209. Id. at 468–69.
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underlying section [6-162] of the Election Law, to wit, adjustment of
the primary election process to better reflect the will of a majority or
sizable plurality of voters. In this accomplishment the State’s
concern cannot be initially frustrated.210

The court’s reasoning on this point is somewhat difficult to unpack,
and its citations to Matter of Devoe and to the State Constitution do
not shed much light on the court’s rationale. Concisely stated, the
court concluded that the “the election process” is inherently a matter
of state concern, and because runoff procedures are part of the
election process, they necessarily touch on matters of state concern.211
To support this conclusion, the court cites to Matter of Devoe, a case
concerning a village law that mandated a random draw in the event of
a tie in an election to fill a vacancy on the village’s board of
trustees.212 The question before the court was whether the village law
conflicted with Article I § 9, and the now repealed Article IX § 9 of
the State Constitution.213 Article I § 9 of the State Constitution, at
the time Matter of Devoe was decided, prohibited localities from
conducting lotteries and the act of selecting the winner of the village’s
election at random was challenged as an unconstitutional lottery.214
Further, Article 9, § 9 of the State Constitution provided that local
officers should be elected by the voters of those localities.215 The
court held that the draw in the event of a tie violated neither of these
constitutional provisions, essentially saying that in the event two
candidates received enough votes to tie, it still reflected the will of the
people if either one of those candidates won the election.216
It is unclear how this holding supports the court’s reasoning in
Procaccino. The court appears to lean on Matter of Devoe for the

210. Id. at 468.
211. Id. at 467–69.
212. 11 A.D.2d 602, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
213. Id. at 611–12.
214. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.
215. The full text of Article IX, § 9 provided:
All city, town and village officers whose election or appointment is not
provided for by this constitution shall be elected by the electors of such
cities, towns and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such
authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate for that purpose. All
other officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by this
constitution and all officers whose offices may hereafter be created by law
shall be elected by the people or appointed, as the legislature may direct.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (repealed).
216. “The choice being limited to the candidates receiving an equal and the
greatest number of votes, the expressed will of those who have voted is effectuated as
nearly as may be.” Matter of Devoe, 11 A.D.2d at 706 (internal quotation omitted).

1338

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

proposition that runoffs are part of the election process, yet this still
does not explain how the local election process itself is a matter of
state concern. Perhaps the court was referring to New York Election
Law § 15-126, which mandates runoffs for villages in the State of New
York in the event of a tie217 (and the candidates in Matter of Devoe
agreed to forgo)218 to demonstrate how the state already mandates
runoffs in local elections and that shows this is a matter of state
concern. But § 15-126 is a law that applies with equal force to all
villages within the state — that is, § 15-126 is a general law.219 Recall
that the state can regulate matters of purely local concern via general
law,220 so this also fails to explain the court’s conclusion in
Procaccino.
The court’s reference to Article IX, § 1 of the State Constitution is
also unhelpful in deciphering its conclusion. The opinion states that
the preamble (§ 1) to Article IX, “[e]ffective local self-government
and intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of the
state,”221 forms the underlying policy of § 6-162. This translates to
“adjust[ing] [] the primary election process to better reflect the will of
a majority or sizable plurality of voters.”222 The court does not go on
to explain how this relates to the policy underlying Article IX, nor
how that underlying policy supports its conclusion.
The opacity of the conclusion that the use of runoffs in three of
New York City’s primaries involve matters of state concern
notwithstanding, the court also fails to address the local election
carveout in MHRL § 10.223 The carveout states in part that local
governments shall have the power to adopt laws relating to
“[t]he . . . mode of selection . . . of its officers.”224 While Procaccino

217. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 15-126 2(b) (2018).
218. Matter of Devoe, 11 A.D.2d at 611.
219. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
220. The state legislature “[s]hall have the power to act in relation to the property,
affairs or government of any local government only by general law . . . .”. N.Y.
CONST. art. IX § 2.
221. Id. § 1.
222. Procaccino v. Bd. of Elections of the City of New York, 73 Misc. 2d 462, 467
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
223. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 2, § 10(1)(i)–(ii)(a)(1) (2018).
224. Id. While New York courts have rarely discussed what exactly is encompassed
by this phrase, a Court of Appeals case from 1927 described it in the following way
when interpreting a predecessor to MHRL: “The term ‘mode of selection’ expresses
an intent to allow a city to determine not only that it shall cause its officers either to
be elected or appointed but connotes also that a municipality may define the precise
method by which either an election or appointment shall be effected.” Bareham v.
City of Rochester, 158 N.E. 51, 53 (N.Y. 1927).
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never squarely addressed this aspect of MHRL, it held that New York
City could simply supersede § 6-162 if it so chose.225 This conclusion
overlooked another section of MHRL, § 34, which contains various
restrictions on localities’ ability to supersede special laws.226
Specifically, § 34(3)(g) states that “a county charter or charter law
shall not supersede any general or special law enacted by the
legislature . . . [i]n . . . [the] election law.”227 Thus, MHRL § 34(3)(g)
seriously calls into question one of the fundamental justifications
motivating the Procaccino court’s conclusion.
While Procaccino provided little justification for its conclusion that
§ 6-162 involves a matter of state concern, appeared to ignore
legislation that explicitly carved out this aspect of local elections as
matters of local concern, and appeared to fundamentally
misunderstand the preemption effects of a special election law, its
ruling was never appealed; both Procaccino and § 6-162 remain good
law.228 This area of election law is a symptom of a larger erosion of
home rule in New York due to the State concern doctrine.229 In the
context of New York City, the state concern doctrine has grown
increasingly broad and has swallowed much of the power that would
appear to reside with the City.230 The erosion of home rule is not
225. Procaccino, 73 Misc. 2d at 469.
226. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34 (2019).
227. Id. 34(3)(g) (emphasis added).
228. While Procaccino has not received much judicial or scholarly attention since it
was decided, when § 6-162 was challenged in federal court as a violation of the Voting
Rights Act in Butts v. City of New York, the court briefly discussed the ruling in
Procaccino. The court noted that although “[t]here was no Home Rule request
before the enactment of [§ 6-162] . . . . the court in Procaccino upheld the statute,
relying in part on the presumption of constitutionality attached to any legislative
enactment.” Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1548 (S.D.N.Y 1985)
(citing Procaccino at 465). The court then extensively recounted § 6-162’s legislative
history, noting that Republican leadership in the State Senate took the position that §
6-162 “was solely a matter affecting the internal affairs of the City of New York.” Id.
at 1551. Yet, “no Home Rule request had been received from the legislative body of
that city, as ordinarily would be thought to be required under the New York
Constitution, Article IX, § 2(b).” Id.
229. See Report and Recommendations Concerning Constitutional Home Rule,
ST.
BAR
ASS’N
(2016),
https://www.nysba.org/homerulereport/
N.Y.
[https://perma.cc/9G8F-K77X] (“The State concern doctrine has narrowed the Home
Rule clause’s guarantee of a modicum of local legislative autonomy. Today, the line
between matters of State concern and matters of local concern is increasingly
indistinct. Few constraints exist of the Legislature’s ability to interfere in local affairs
by special law.”).
230. See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State of New York, 993 N.E.2d 393, 400
(N.Y 2013) (finding regulation of New York City taxicabs to be matter of state
concern); City of New York v. State of New York, 730 N.E.2d 920, 926–27 (N.Y 2000)
(finding matter of state concern in easing burden on non-New York City residents
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unique to New York — on the national scale, local authority has
increasingly been constrained or removed altogether in recent
years.231
III. THE PATH OF MOST RESISTANCE: A ROADMAP TO IRV IN NEW
YORK CITY
IRV would significantly improve New York City’s elections and, at
the very minimum, should be implemented to replace existing runoff
primary elections.
This Part first argues that from a policy
perspective, IRV should be adopted by New York City, as well as by
other cities and states, because it leads to a fairer, cheaper, and more
democratic elections.
However, this Part also argues against
implementing IRV through the state legislature by amending § 6-162
or via charter revision while § 6-162 remains in effect. Instead,
implementing IRV by repealing or striking down § 6-162, and then
revising the City Charter to implement IRV, is in the best long-term
interest of the City.232
A. Policy Considerations in Implementing IRV
IRV systems have little downside and considerable upside, and
IRV elections have been largely successful where implemented.233 In

who commute into City); Uniformed Firefighters Ass’n v. City of New York, 405
N.E.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. 1980) (finding residency of New York City employees to be
matter of state concern).
231. See Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization,
128 YALE L.J. 954, 964–974 (2019). Professor Davidson attributes much of this to instate redistricting that locks in partisan advantages that allow a single party to more
easily control both houses of a given state legislature and the governorship. Id. at 964.
When a single party reaches this level of in-state political domination, “[t]here is
evidence of a tipping point institutionally with respect to preemption.” Id. Professor
Davidson concludes:
As a result, states in recent years have sought to constrain or remove local
authority across a striking range of policy areas and with increasing
vehemence. This wave of preemption reflects a mix of deregulatory
libertarianism — particularly focused on employment, the environment, and
technology — and social conservatives’ concerns about religious liberty and
reducing immigration, forming a shared agenda of reducing local power.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., AntiSanctuary and Immigration Localism, 199 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 848 (2019) (noting
how after federal efforts to curtail the power of sanctuary cities (typically cities that
refuse to comply with federal immigration initiatives) largely stalled, states housing
sanctuary cities have begun curtailing the autonomy of sanctuary cities to comply
with the federal government).
232. Supra Section II.B.ii.
233. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
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New York City, IRV should be implemented if for no other reason
than to replace existing runoff primary elections, which have proven
to be both expensive and under-inclusive.234 While voter education
initiatives may impose some up-front costs on the City,235 those costs
will be negligible when compared to the money saved by forgoing
runoff elections.236 The criticisms of IRV should not be ignored,
however, and local and state governments should pay close attention
to the concerns that IRV critics raise.237 Perhaps the most important
of these criticisms is that voter confusion that may occur in IRV
systems could disproportionately affect poor communities and
communities of color.238 The City should take this into account when
implementing voter education programs to ensure that these
communities are adequately included in these programs. The City
should also keep a close eye on data from IRV elections in order to
evaluate whether its education initiatives are equally effective across
the socioeconomic spectrum.
However, the argument for implementing IRV — adequately
discussed by experts in the social sciences239 — is not the primary
focus of this Note. Instead, this Note focuses on how New York City

234. Supra Section I.D.
235. Supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
236. For a discussion of the costs associated with IRV, see supra notes 81–101 and
accompanying text. In the state of Massachusetts, the estimated cost of state-wide
voter education was $500,000. Rhode, supra note 84. The population of
Massachusetts is just under 7 million. See Massachusetts Population 2019, WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/massachusettspopulation/ [https://perma.cc/VPZ6-GLJC] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). The
population of New York City, on the other hand, is about 8.5 million. See New York
City,
New
York
Population
2019,
WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/new-york-city-population/
[https://perma.cc/3AMK-33Y4] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). While there may be
additional factors to consider in this comparison, it is difficult to see how those
factors could bring the cost for voter education in New York City anywhere close to
the $13.8 million the 2013 runoff cost the City. See Taylor, supra note 104.
237. See generally supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
238. Supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
239. See generally, e.g., COREY COOK & DAVID LATTERMAN, RANKED CHOICE
VOTING IN THE 2011 SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL ELECTION: FINAL REPORT (2011),
https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1002&ccontex=mccarthy_fac [https://perma.cc/3UP7-U7ZB];
Jim Anest, Ranked Choice Voting: A Path Toward a More Integral Politics, 4 J.
INTEGRAL THEORY & PRAC. 3 (2009); Francis Neely et al., An Assessment of
Ranked-Choice Voting in the San Francisco 2004 Election, PUB. RES. INST. (May
2005),
http://archive.fairvote.org/sfrcv/SFSU-PRI_RCV_final_report_June_30.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VP6M-FFMK].
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should implement IRV. To that end, the remainder of this Part
explores various options and makes a recommendation.
B.

New York City’s Paths to Implementing IRV Under Current
State Law

As IRV has gained traction in New York City, there are increased
calls to implement IRV for city primaries through a Charter Revision,
which would involve having City voters consider the issue on election
day.240 Under the current state of the law, the City would need to
exclude from the consideration primary elections for mayor,
comptroller, and public advocate241 — the elections that IRV would
most benefit.242 New York City cannot implement IRV for these
elections; § 6-162, a “special law” within New York’s Election Law,243
cannot be superseded by a New York City charter revision, because §
34 of the Municipal Home Rule Law prohibits exactly this.244 The
examples provided in Part II, where New York City unilaterally
introduced laws concerning campaign finance245 and term limits,246
are distinguishable from the IRV issue in an important way — in both
of these cases, the applicable state election law was a general law, not
a special law like § 6-162.247 As discussed in Part II, a locality like
New York City can pass local laws that are more restrictive than a
state general law.248 As long as the City’s laws do not permit what
would otherwise be restricted under state law, the City’s laws should
not be preempted.249
In the case of IRV, the City could
hypothetically pass a law that imposes a runoff where no candidate
captures 50% of the total vote, as opposed to 40% like it is now.250
But can this city replace runoffs with and IRV system with a
threshold above 40%? This option, among others, is discussed in the
next sub-section.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Supra Section I.E.
Infra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section II.B.
Supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
Supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.i.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018).
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A City IRV Statute with a Vote Threshold Greater than Forty
Percent

One could argue that, because § 6-162 is only triggered in a primary
“when no candidate for the office of mayor, public advocate or
comptroller receives 40% or more of the votes cast,”251 an IRV statute
that required a candidate to obtain any percentage of the vote greater
than 40% would not be inconsistent with § 6-162. Because § 6-162
does not say how that initial primary vote needs to be conducted, it
could be argued that the law would not prohibit the use of IRV. In
this scenario, where the IRV statute mandated, for example, a 50%
vote threshold,252 then after the initial IRV election, a candidate
would never have less than 40% of the vote and thus § 6-162 would
never apply.
While there may be some merit to this argument, it should
ultimately be rejected for a few reasons. First, a plain reading of § 6162 would suggest that it only authorizes the use of a traditional
runoff system for primary elections, not other systems in place of a
runoff — such as IRV.253 Second, this method would essentially
render § 6-162 obsolete, which would be contrary to the presumption
against ineffectiveness with which statutes should be read.254 Third,
while it could be argued that the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 6162 was to prevent low plurality primary winners,255 and that purpose
would not be frustrated by introducing IRV in place of traditional
runoffs, IRV was not something the legislature contemplated at the
time § 6-162 was drafted. Although this argument may have
legislative purpose on its side, other, more widely accepted methods
of statutory interpretation weigh against this argument.
Adopting IRV under this understanding of § 6-162 would leave the
IRV statute exposed to a possible legal challenge based on the
previous points. IRV laws have been challenged on multiple
occasions256 and there is no reason to believe the same will not occur
251. Id.
252. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
253. “[W]hen no candidate . . . receives forty percent or more of the votes
cast . . . [the] city shall conduct a run-off primary election between the two candidates
receiving the greatest number of votes for the same office.” N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162
(emphasis added); see supra note 201.
254. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 181, at 93–100.
255. See supra Section II.B.i.
256. See, e.g., Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fourteenth
Amendment claim against San Francisco’s IRV system); Me. Republican Party v.
Dunlap, 324 F. Supp. 3d 202 (D. Me. 2018) (Maine Republicans brought First
Amendment freedom of association claim after the state adopted IRV). The First
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in New York City. Further, the power to regulate these primary
elections would still reside with the state, which could amend § 6-162
in the future in a variety of ways that may be contrary to the desires
and interests of New York City. For these reasons, it would be
unwise for New York City to proceed in this manner.

ii.

Abolishing Primaries to Circumvent § 6-162

Another more plausible argument is that New York City could
simply eliminate primary elections in favor of a single, general IRV
election for New York City’s most important local positions. Section
6-162 is only triggered during a primary election,257 but an IRV
system could replace the primary system in New York City
altogether, thus rendering § 6-162 obsolete. This would be a wise
policy choice and New York City would not be the first city to choose
to replace its primary system entirely by implementing IRV.258
Indeed, one of the promises of IRV is that it can replace a primary
election, saving the expense involved in conducting a separate
election prior to a general election.259 Besides eliminating the
expense of holding a primary elections — not to mention the costs
involved in holding a subsequent runoff election should no candidate
reach the 40% threshold — a single IRV election would avoid lowturnout primary elections, thereby involving more of the city’s
population in the electoral process.260
While there is nothing in the text of § 6-162 that directly contradicts
such a maneuver,261 there would still likely be a question under this
course of action as to whether § 6-162 implicitly requires primary
elections for mayor, comptroller, and public advocate. Two of same
points mentioned in the previous scenario would also apply here. A
reading that the statute does not require primary elections would
render § 6-162 obsolete, but at the same time one could argue that

Amendment argument against IRV derives from the series of Supreme Court cases
concerning primary election regulations, discussed supra note 51. See, e.g., Dunlap,
324 F. Supp at 208–13 (discussing the various burdens IRV in primary elections
imposes on a party and weighing them against the state regulatory interest in
implementing IRV).
257. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018) (“when no candidate . . . receives forty percent
or more of the votes . . . in a city-wide primary election, the board of elections of such
city shall conduct a run-off primary election” (emphasis added)).
258. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
259. Supra Section I.C.
260. Supra Section I.D.
261. See supra notes 147–52.
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because the statute (or any other state law) does not explicitly require
primary elections, a requirement should not be read into the statute.
Legislative intent and purpose are also relevant when considering
this argument. It is reasonable to assume that the legislature never
contemplated that there would not be a primary election at the time §
6-162 was drafted. In fact, primaries may have been so embedded in
the legislature’s understanding of how elections should be conducted
that it did not believe an explicit requirement would be necessary. In
other words, the legislature may have never considered it necessary to
write a requirement for primary elections into the statute. As to
purpose, replacing primary elections with IRV would likely still be in
line with the purpose of § 6-162, which was to avoid low plurality
winners. As discussed in Part I, IRV elections can largely prevent
vote-splitting among members that leads to the opposing, more
unified party’s victory — which is the underlying purpose of primary
elections.
One additional point worth discussing is whether § 6-162 has the
effect of field preempting New York City from eliminating primary
elections, or, for that matter, changing its primary elections for
mayor, comptroller, public advocate in any manner whatsoever. As
previously discussed, the New York State legislature can express its
intent to completely occupy a field either expressly or impliedly.262
The text of § 6-162 does not expressly state the legislature’s intent to
occupy the field of primaries for the three offices mentioned in § 6162.263 Where, as is the case in other special laws, the statutory text
expressly prohibits the locality from passing any laws in the given
field, the legislature has unequivocally expressed intent to occupy that
regulatory field.264 The text of § 6-162 contains no such language, so
there’s little question that there is no express intent by the State to
occupy this field.
Nor does there appear to be any implied intention by the
legislature to occupy this field.265 The legislative history of § 6-162
indicates that the purpose of § 6-162 was not to restrict New York
City’s ability to regulate how it conducts its elections.266 Rather, the
law was intended to prevent candidates from winning primaries by
obtaining a low percentage of the vote in a crowded electoral field.267
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra Section II.A.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018).

See supra Section II.A.i.
See supra notes 155–64.
See supra Section II.A.i.
See supra Section II.B.i.
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Additionally, the state has never employed any type of regulatory
scheme to further this goal.268 For these reasons, it seems clear that
New York City is not field preempted by § 6-126.
On balance, it is difficult to say one way or the other whether the
elimination of primary elections would be permissible under § 6-162.
This uncertainty, however — even if the uncertainty is low — makes
this a risky path for the City. An IRV law eliminating primary
elections in New York City would be susceptible to a legal challenge
and, the state would still retain the ultimate authority to regulate.
Additionally, the elimination of primary elections is a drastic
change to the election process that would require considerable
adjustment on the part of candidates as well as parties. How party
resources would be distributed among multiple party candidates
running in the same general election is one of the major issues that
comes to mind when discussing this option. While there are likely
solutions to these problems and the ultimate elimination of primary
elections is a worthy goal, this could perhaps be a case where the City
tries to run before it has learned to walk. Small steps, beginning with
the implementation of IRV to replace existing primary runoffs, are
probably the wisest course of action.
While each of the solutions discussed thus far provides a possible
means by which New York City could unilaterally implement IRV,
the City does not necessarily need to act unilaterally in order to
implement IRV.

iii. Amending § 6-162 Via the State Legislature
One of seemingly more obvious solutions to this issue is for the
State Legislature to amend § 6-162 in the way previous bills have
suggested.269 Although the current legislature in Albany may be
more favorable to IRV,270 relying on the legislature is an undesirable
solution. First, history has demonstrated that bills attempting to
amend § 6-162 have failed to gain enough support to clear both
houses of the State Legislature.271 Second, while IRV may seem like
the best option for the City today, a better system could be
introduced in the future, and the City would need to once again go
through the State — which may not view the new system favorably —
in order to implement this system. Further, while the state political

268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra note 115–17.
See supra notes 23, 118.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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climate may currently be favorable to IRV advocates, that could also
change in the future. Most importantly, however, amending § 6-162
would allow the State to retain authority over an aspect of New York
City’s elections that should be reserved to the City under New York’s
home rule doctrine and the State Constitution.272 The final section of
this Note will discuss this issue and propose a path forward.

iv. Challenging § 6-162 as Unconstitutional
Section 6-162 is a clear violation of New York’s Constitution and
Municipal Home Rule Law. The initial version of § 6-162 included
language that attempted to masquerade a special law as a general
law,273 in that the statute applied to “cities with a population above 1
million.”274 Of course, the legislature knew at the time that the effect
of the law was to target only New York City — the only city in the
state at the time with a population above one million people.275 This
allowed the State to circumvent the procedures required for
implementing a special law — namely a request from the locality to
do so, something the City never did.276 One question that arises here
is why the State Legislature felt the need to avoid naming New York
City specifically. If this was so clearly a matter of state concern, it is
interesting that the State was reluctant to pass § 6-162 as a facially
special law.
The legislature also received significant assistance from the state
judiciary when the law was challenged in Procaccino,277 where the
court’s decision was seriously flawed multiple respects. As an initial
matter, the Court’s reasoning that New York City can simply
supersede § 6-162 when it sees fit278 is a borderline reckless reading of
the law. As the text of § 32 of MHRL make very clear, a locality has
no ability to supersede a special law found within the Election Law.279
This understanding of § 32, which only requires a plain reading of the

272. Consider an example in 2002, where the state amended § 6-162 to apply to
public advocate instead of the president of the city council. See supra notes 198 and
accompanying text.
273. Procaccino v. Bd. of Elections of City of New York, 73 Misc. 2d 462, 468 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1973) (finding § 6-162 to be “a local law masquerading as general”).
274. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 131-a (1972).
275. Id.
276. Supra Section II.B.i.
277. 73 Misc. 2d 462.
278. Supra Section II.B.ii.
279. Supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
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text free from any interpretive heavy lifting, has since been applied by
the New York Court of Appeals with ease.280
Even putting aside this fundamental misunderstanding of special
law preemption in the context of election laws, the court still ignores §
10 of MHRL, which makes clear that “the method of appointment” of
local officers is a matter of local concern.281 While the State certainly
has an interest in elections generally,282 MHRL makes clear that the
method of appointment of strictly local officers is a matter reserved to
the locality.283 In Procaccino, the proffered matter of statewide
concern accepted by the court is the “adjustment of the primary
election process to better reflect the will of a majority or sizable
plurality of voters.”284 It is hard to see how this can be a matter of
state concern based on New York’s jurisprudence in this area. As
discussed earlier, a matter of state concern must “be in a substantial
degree a matter of State concern.”285 To substantially relate to a
matter of state concern, the matter must “serve a supervening State
concern”286 and “relate to life, health, and the quality of life” of the
people of New York State. 287 There must be a state-wide concern
involved that is “supported in the language, structure, or legislative
history of the statute.”288 The opinion failed to address any of these
elements with reasonable rigor, which is further evidence that
Procaccino was wrongly decided.

280. See, e.g., Baldwin Union Free School Dist. v. County of Nassau, 9 N.E.3d 351
(N.Y. 2014); see also Monahan v. Murphy, 71 A.D.2d 92, 94 (1979), aff’d, 412 N.E.2d
1326 (1980) (“no county charter or charter law shall supersede the Election Law”);
Mohr v. Giambra, 7 Misc. 3d 723, 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 27 A.D.3d 1185
(2006) (“The provisions of the Election Law . . . cannot be superseded by [county
charter]” (citing NY. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34(g)(3))).
281. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 2, § 10(1)(i)-(ii)(a)(1)-(2) (1964).
282. “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that
government must play an active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical matter,
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest
and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes.’” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974)). Clearly, states governments have an interest in assuring “that
elections are operated equitably and efficiently.” Id.
283. Id.
284. Procaccino, 73 Misc. 2d at 467.
285. Alder v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 705 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J., concurring); see
also supra notes 149–55.
286. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1977).
287. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benv. Ass’n of New York, Inc., 676 N.E 2d
847, 852. (N.Y. 1996).
288. Id.
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First, the legislative history shows that § 6-162 was really the result
of state Democrats reacting to an election result they did not like.289
There is also ample evidence that § 6-162 was passed in part because
of racist motivations by state Democrats, who believed that Herman
Badillo — the first Puerto Rican to run for New York City office and
secured 28 of the vote in the 1969 mayoral primary — came too close
to winning the Democratic nomination.290 There is nothing in the
legislative history of § 6-162 that would suggest that the State
Legislature was even remotely considering a statewide interest when
it passed § 6-162. Nor does the text of § 6-162 appear to implicate a
statewide interest.
Further, the Court fails to explain why, if ensuring primary
elections were decided with a larger plurality of the electorate, the
legislature chose only to implicate this interest for three primary
elections in New York City. If the state was really concerned with
protecting this interest, why not enact similar legislation for statewide
elections? Indeed, the three aforementioned offices in New York
City are the only elections in which the Election Law requires a
runoff. It would seem to follow that if this was truly a significant
statewide interest, the state would enact similar legislation for
gubernatorial elections, as well as for state and federal congressional
elections. But no such runoff laws exist, and the Court never asked
why.
Ultimately, the holding that primary elections for three officials
who serve only the City of New York is a matter of state concern
stretches the imagination and begs the question — if the mode of
selection in local primary elections for strictly local officers are
matters of state concern, what is not a matter of state concern?
Following this reasoning, the doctrine of home rule becomes a paperthin shield for New York localities, standing little chance of
protecting purely local interests against an increasingly powerful
regulatory sword wielded by the State.291
For the aforementioned reasons, the case against the
constitutionality of § 6-162 is strong. While state lawmakers from
New York City who are introducing legislation to amend § 6-162
likely believe they are acting in the best interest of the City, they
would be truly acting in the best interest of the City by repealing § 6162. An alternative option to abolishing § 6-162 is by challenging it in

289. See supra Section II.B.i.
290. See McKay, supra note 187, at 501; see also note 194 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 144.
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a court as unconstitutional, where it is difficult to see how a court
would agree with the Procaccino court’s assessment of the law.
Either of these options would unambiguously clear the way for New
York City to implement IRV through a charter revision. Moreover, it
would transfer local electoral power back to the people of New York
City, power that was unconstitutionally usurped by the State in the
first place.
CONCLUSION
In 1927, the New York Court of Appeals said in Bareham v. City of
Rochester that “[t]he term ‘mode of selection’ expresses an intent to

allow a city to determine not only that it shall cause its officers either
to be elected or appointed but connotes also that a municipality may
define the precise method by which either an election or appointment
shall be effected.”292 This principal perfectly captures the issue
underlying the discussion in this Note and makes clear that § 6-162 is
incompatible with long-held principles of home rule. For too long,
this usurpation of local power to determine the mode of selection by
which purely local officers are chosen has gone unchallenged. The
IRV conversation in New York City presents both the City and the
State with an opportunity to restore the proper dynamic between
those areas of regulation reserved to the state and those reserved to
localities. While the policy arguments regarding IRV and the
elimination of primary elections will further develop as more cities
and states experiment with this voting system, what remains clear —
the task of evaluating IRV for New York City’s elections should
reside solely with New York City’s citizens.

292. 158 N.E. 51, 53 (N.Y 1927).

